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RECENT CASES AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE*

S

the effective date of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, decisions construing them have been many and
varied. It seems appropriate, therefore, to consider some of
the subjects concerning which there has been considerable
judicial interpretation.
INCE

I
BILLS OF PAnTICiJLARs

To a practitioner in the New York State courts Rule
12 (e) dealing with motions for a more definite statement or
for a bill of particulars appears somewhat strange. Unlike
our state practice, a bill of particulars and a more definite
statement under Rule 12(e) are not different forms; they
are substantially merged into one device to serve one purpose
so far as a motion addressed to a complaint, counterclaim or
cross-claim is concerned-namely, to recast a pleading so
that the moving party may properly prepare his responsive
bleading.
The different functions performed by the bill of particulars in federal practice are accentuated by the fact that while
in New York a bill of particulars as a general rule cannot be
obtained until issue has been joined,1 in the federal courts
* Lecture delivered at the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
on April 3, 1941, under the auspices of the Committee on Post-Admission Legal
Education of the Association (Hon. Bernard L. Shientag, Chairman). Citations
of cases published since its delivery have, of course, been added.
13 CARMODY, N. Y. PRAcricE (Perm. ed. 1930) 2433.
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the motion must be made before answering; 2 this is in accord
with the New York rule that a motion for a more definite
statement must be made before answer.3
This radically different purpose of the federal bill of
particulars was effectively illustrated by Judge Clark of the
Second Circuit about three years ago in an address given at
an annual dinner of the New York County Lawyers' Association.4 He observed that in New York, pleadings had been
confused with the evidence; that attempts had been made to
use bills of particulars to supply proof. It was his belief that
the only proper function of the pleadings was to establish
the general boundaries of the action, to provide a basis for
res judicta,or the binding force of the final judgment to be
rendered; and, therefore, the bill of particulars should be
used only to remove indefiniteness in the pleading and not as
a substitute for depositions and discovery. In fact, he thought
the bill could be abolished altogether, leaving the objections
to a pleading to be raised by motion to dismiss on the ground
that the pleading failed to state any claim or defense. 5
In effect, therefore, a motion for a bill of particulars or
for a more definite statement of a complaint under the Federal Rules corresponds to what is known in New York State
practice as a motion to make the complaint more definite
and certain.
2 Rule 12(e); Trounstine v. Bauer, Pogue & Co., Inc., 1 F. R. D. 363
(S. D. N. Y. 1940); Cary v. Hardy, 1 F. R. D. 355 (E. D. Tenn. 1940);
McKenna v. U. S. Lines, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 558 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Tully v.
Howard, 27 F. Supp. 6 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Westmoreland Asbestos Co., Inc.
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 2 F. R. S. 115 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Michels v. Ripley,
26 F. Supp. 959 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Alropa Corp. v. Heyn, 30 F. Supp. 668

(W. D. Pa. 1939).

3 CARMODY, N. Y. PRACTICE (Perm. ed. 1930) 2198.
(1938) A. B. A. J. 22-24.
5 See also concurring opinion of the learned judge in Federal Trade Comm.
v. Biddle PurchasingCo., 117 F. (2d) 29, 30 (1941) : "But I think it is clear as
to trial courts that where a claim for relief is presented, motions for particulars
almost always serve to delay adjudication, with rarely any benefit in clarity or
3

4

in limiting proof * * *";

Schaefer, Current Procedural Objections (1941)

27

A. B. A. J. 364. To eliminate the bill of particulars or more definite statement
completely seems to overlook the fact that in complicated actions where the
plaintiff is prone to plead nothing but generalities as for instance in anti-trust
actions, a bill or a more definite statement is a very helpful and proper machinery for the defendant. Depositions alone will not aid the defendant See
Caskey and Young, The Bill of Particulars-ABrief for the Defendant (1941)
27 VA. L. REv. 472; see Lowe v. Consolidated Edison Co., Inc., 1 F. R. D. 559
(S. D. N. Y. 1940); Fleming v. Southern Kraft Corp., 37 F. Supp. 232
(S. D. N. Y. 1940).

1941]

DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL PRACTICE

3

Judge Knight of the Western District of New York in
United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, Ino.,6 explained

Rule 12(e) very clearly, by stating:
* * * when Rule 12(e) is considered in connection with the
provisions for discovery and interrogatories, it seems plain that the
intent of the draftsmen was that the words "to prepare for trial"
relate only to matters necessary to be known to a party to put his
pleading in such shape that all the issues might understandingly be
met. The two provisions of the rule are to be read with substantially
equal effect. The bill of particulars was not intended to take the old
meaning and have the old use of the former bill of particulars. Considering the discovery and interrogatory provision, this would have
been a clear duplication. * * * The purpose of each of the separate
provisions of Rule 12(e) is the same. * * *

According to Rule 12(e) a party may only obtain a bill
of particulars "to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to preparefor trial". The words "to prepare
for trial", in federal procedure, would seem to have a very
restricted meaning. They simply cover the situation where
a responsive pleading is not permitted. For example, the
plaintiff ordinarily may not interpose a reply where the an6 1 F. R. D. 205 (W. D. N. Y. 1940); see also Madsen v. Palmer,
2 F. R. D. 13 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); Martz, et al. v. Abbott, et al., 2
F. R. D. 17 (M. D. Pa. 1941); Poole v. White, 2 F. R. D. 40 (N. D.
W. Va. 1941); Steingut v. Guaranty Trust Co., 1 F. R. D. 723 (S. D.
N. Y. 1941); Kellogg Co. v. Nat. Biscuit Co., 38 F. Supp. 643 (D.
N. J. 1941); Battin Amusement Co. v. Cocalis Amusement Co., 1 F. R.
D. 769 (D. N. J. 1941); Phila. Retail Jewelers Ass'n v. L. & C. Mayers
Co., 1 F. R. D. 606 (E. D. Pa. 1941); Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper
Co. v. Anchor Hocking Qass Corp., 1 F. R. D. 647 (W. D. Pa. 1941); Clark
Door Co., Inc. v. Yeager, 1 F. R. D. 770 (M. D. Pa. 1941); Corteau v. Interlake S.S. Co., 1 F. R. D. 429 (W. D. Mich. 1940); Leimer v. State Mutual L.
Ass'n Co., 1 F. R. D. 386 (W. D. Mo. 1940); Marin v. Knopf, 1 F. R. D. 436
(S. D. N. Y. 1940); McElwain v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 1 F. R. D. 177
(W. D. N. Y. 1940); Brockway Glass Co., Inc. v. Hartford-Empire Co.,
1 F. R. D. 242 (W. D. N. Y. 1940); Trounstine v. Bauer Pogue & Co., Inc.,
1 F. R. D. 363 (S. D. N. Y. 1940) ; Brown v. Fire Ass'n of Phila., 1 F. R. D.
450 (S. D. N. Y. 1940); Lasicki v. Socony Oil Co., Inc., 1 F. R. D. 384 (M. D.
Pa. 1940); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 730
(M. D. Tenn. 1940); Tully v. Howard, 27 F. Supp. 6 (S. D. N. Y. 1939);
Rosenblum v. Dingfelder, 1 F. R. D. 179 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Sheehan v.
Municipal L. & P. Co., 1 F. R. D. 70 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Coca-Cola Co. v.
Marbert Products, Inc., 2 F. R. S. 107 (E. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Adams v. Hendel,
28 F. Supp. 317 (E. D. Pa. 1939); Fried v. Warner Bros. C. M. Corp., 26
F. Supp. 603 (E. D. Pa. 1939) ; Brinley v. Lewis, 27 F. Supp. 313 (M. D. Pa.
1939); Pearson v. Hershey Creamery Co., 30 F. Supp. 82 (M. D. Pa. 1939);
American La France Foamite Corp. v. American Oil Co., 25 F. Supp. 386
(D. Mass. 1938).
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swer contains only denials and affirmative defenses; the
affirmative defenses are automatically deemed denied. Of
course, these affirmative defenses may be so indefinitely
stated that the automatic denials will not clearly raise the
actual issues; in that case the opposing party may need a
bill of particulars, that is, a more definite statement of the
affirmative defenses, in order to know what real issues must
be met at the trial. To give any broader content than this to
the words "1or to prepare for trial" would seem unjustified
in view of the sharp distinction attempted in the Federal
Rules between pleadings and proof. Consider Prutinsky v.
Commercial Union Assurance Co., Ltd.,7 where Judge Hulbert granted a motion for a bill of particulars of "affirmative" defenses but not of so-called permissive defensesallegations in affirmative form which merely amplify the denials in the answer and which could have been proved under
a general denial.
Since the bill of particulars becomes part of the pleading and supplements the pleading, it follows that evidentiary
matter should not be part of a bill of particulars. Indeed,
no evidentiary matter could be obtained under the old federal practice. 8
Although the reasons given under the new Rules for refusing demands of evidentiary matter differ, namely (1) "this
is in fact a motion to make the pleading more definite and
certain in order properly to prepare the responsive pleading",
or (2) "ample provision for obtaining evidentiary matter is
contained in the discovery rules", the cases are practically
unanimous in denying a motion asking for evidentiary
matter. 9
71
F. R. D. 440 (S. D. N. Y. 1940); Fleming, etc. v. Southern Kraft
Corp., 37 F. Supp. 232 (S. D. N. Y. 1940) ; see also Bushwick-Decatur Motors,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 1 F. R. D. 19 (E. D. N. Y. 1939); Abruzzino v. Nat.
Fire Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 934 (N. D. W. Va. 1939). But see Sharp v. Penn.Reading Seashore Lines, 1 F. R. D. 16 (D. N. J.1939).
8 Alaska S.S. Co. v. Katzeek, 16 F. (2d) 210 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926);
Kalabany v. News Syndicate Co., Inc., 1 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. N. Y. 1932).
9Fleming v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 39 F. Supp. 237 (W. D. Ark.
1941); Gum, Inc. v. Gumakers of America, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 586 (E. D. Pa.
1941); Cox v. Doherty, 1 F. R. D. 564 (S. D. Cal. 1941); Bakelite Corp. v.
Lubri-Zol Develop. Corp., 36 F. Supp. 105 (D. Del. 1940); Saxton v. W. S.
Askew Co., 35 F. Supp. 519 (N. D. Ga. 1940); Graziano v. Mich. Associated
Express Co., Inc., 1 F. R. D. 530 (N. D. Ill. 1940); Smith v. Buckeye Incubator Co., 3 F. R. S.134 (S.D. Ohio 1940) ; United States for use of Phillips
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An interesting question came before Judge Hulbert in
Piest v. Tide Water Oil Co,1 There, it appeared that prior

to answer in a removed case the defendants had applied for
a bill of particulars, which motion was granted in its entirety.

The bill was served and thus under Rule 12(e) be-

came a part of the complaint and necessarily supplemented
the allegations of the complaint. The defendants then interposed an answer which plaintiff asserted denied only the
allegations of the complaint, and disregarded the additional
statements contained in the bill of particulars. Plaintiff accordingly moved for a more definite statement by the defendants admitting or denying each allegation of the plaintiff's
bill of particulars. Judge Hulbert treated defendant's motion for a bill of particulars as one to make the complaint
more definite and certain and said accordingly that under
the state practice, if the motion were granted it would be
necessary for the plaintiff to reframe his complaint and the
answer would be directed to the complaint as refrained. His
holding, however, was as follows:
Under the practice laid down in the Federal Rules* * * there
is no such refraining of a pleading but after the bill is served it is left
open to conjecture whether or not the denials in an answer are made
with reference to the complaint as originally served or as modified.
The Rules being intended to effect a simplification, a statement of a
cause of action with the greatest brevity is to be desired. The motion,
therefore, is denied * * *

The rules 1 1 of the District Courts of the Southern and
Eastern Districts of New York provide that where an order
v. Anthony P. Miller, Inc., 3 F. R. S. 129 (D. N. J. 1940) ; Egyes v. Magyar
Nemzeti Bank, 1 F. R. D. 498 (E. D. N. Y. 1940) ; United States v. Crescent
Amusement Co., 31 F. Supp. 730 (M. D. Tenn. 1940); Brinley v. Lewis, 27 F.
Supp. 313 (M. D. Pa. 1939); Adams v. Hendel, 28 F. Supp. 317 (E. D. Pa.
1939); Fishback v. Solvay Process Co., 29 F. Supp. 583 (N. D. N. Y. 1939);
Mann v. Cadillac Auto Co., 29 F. Supp. 495 (D. Mass. 1939); Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation v. Vitamin Tech, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 8 (S. D. Cal.
1939) ; Tarbett v. Thorpe, 25 F. Supp. 222 (W. D. Pa. 1938) ; Jessup & Moore
Paper Co. v. West Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 25 F. Supp. 598 (D. Del. 1938);
Bicknell v. Lloyd-Smith, 25 F. Supp. 657 (E. D. N. Y. 1938); however, we
find the probably inadvertent statement in Prutinsky v. Commercial Union
Ass'n Co., Ltd., 1 F. R. D. 440 (S. D. N. Y. 1940) that a motion for a bill of
particulars calls for "evidence and not ultimate facts".
10 27 F. Supp. 1021 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
11 E. D. & S. D. Civil Rule 10.
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under Rule 12 (e) is granted and "the pleading or bill which
is served in purported compliance therewith fails to meet the
terms of the order, a party before applying for other relief
may make a motion for a further statement or bill." It is to
be noted that these rules talk about a further "pleading" for
which no express provision is found in the Federal Rules.
Although the bill of particulars becomes part of the
complaint, the purpose of the bill of particulars is to assist
the defendant in framing his answer and not so that the
defendant may plead to the particular items which may be
contained in the bill of particulars. Furthermore, it seems
fairly clear that the primary reason for inserting in Rule
12(e) the provision that the bill of particulars becomes a
part of the pleading was to do away with the doctrine found
in some jurisdictions that the bill of particulars is not part
of the complaint. 12 And also, there is no provision in the
rules or generally in state practice requiring a party to plead
to a bill of particulars. On this view as to the nature of a
bill of particulars, the denial of the motion would seem correct. But still the motion is deemed identical with a motion
to make the pleading more definite and certain.
The holding in Piest v. Tide Water Oil, 1 however, may
be contrary to the view of the Advisory Committee as indicated by question and answer on page 304 of the N. Y.
Symposium on Federal Rules.
Question Rule 12(e) provides that a bill of particulars becomes part of the pleading which it supplements. Must a defendant
answer the bill of particulars as well as the complaint?
Answer As the bill of particulars in the ordinary course, comes
before the answer, the answer will be so drawn as to admit or deny
the averments of the complaint as supplemented (made definite) by
the bill of particulars. The answer should refer to the bill of particulars to the extent appropriate in order to comply with the requirements
of Rule 8(b). 14
Furthermore, the possible risk of an implied admission under
Rule 8(d) would be avoided under this interpretation.
12

Commentary, 2 F. R. S. 642, 643.

13 See note 10, supra.
14 Rule 8(b) prescribes the forms of denials, etc. in a pleading; see FoRw,
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, PARTIES AND

TRIAL PROCEDURE,

1 F. R. D. 315, 322-323.

PRE-
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On the question whether a bill of particulars of a complaint can be used on a motion to dismiss the complaint
under Rule 12 (b), Judge Leibell in Reilly v. Walcott,'5 held
that a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted may be directed to the complaint as
supplemented by the bill of particulars.
This decision is in conformity with the holdings in the
New York State courts that a bill of particulars may be considered on motions for judgment on the pleadings."8 However, this line of thought might well in a federal case require
the defendant in his answer to plead not merely to the complaint as such, but also to the bill of particulars which was
furnished pursuant to his demand to amplify the complaint.
In Mahoney v. Bethlehem Engineering Corp.,17 Judge
Leibell very properly held that since a motion to dismiss a
complaint for failure to state a claim should be decided upon
the complaint as supplemented by the bill of particulars (if
a bill of particulars has been served), a motion for a bill
of particulars should be granted so that defendant may thereafter move to dismiss on the complaint and bill of particulars.
On the other hand, Judge Holly in Smitlh v. Employers
Fire Ins. Co., 8 has held that a bill of particulars will not be
ordered to enable the moving party thereafter to make a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim,
apparently on the theory that a motion for a bill of particulars should only be granted to prepare a responsive
pleading.
On the question whether it is a defense to a motion for
a bill of particulars to say that the information which the
defendant seeks is within his own knowledge, the courts have
disagreed.' 9 Since the purpose of a bill of particulars is to
15 1 F. R. D. 103 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
'16N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 476; Russell v. Societe Anonyme des Establissements Aeroxon, 268 N. Y. 173, 197 N. E. 185 (1935); Seamans v. Barentsen,

180 N. Y. 333, 73 N. E. 42 (1905).

17 27 F. Supp. 865 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Sheehan v. Municipal L. & P. Co.,
1 F. R. D. 256 (S. D. N. Y. 1940) ; see also Reilly v. Wolcott, 1 F. R. D. 103
(S. D. N. Y. 1939); Mendola v. Carborundum Co., 26 F. Supp. 359 (W. D.
N. Y. 1938); Request for Bill of Particularsto PrepareMotion to Dismiss,
2 F. R. S. 1222.
18 1 F. R. D. 251 (N. D. Ill. 1940) ; see also Gumbart v. Waterbury Club
Holding
Corp., 27 F. Supp. 228 (D. Conn. 1938).
9

- Pro: Gum, Inc. v. Gumakers of America, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 586 (E. D.
Pa. 1941); Phila. Retail Jewelers Ass'n v. L. & C. Mayers Co., 1 F. R. D. 606
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obtain not evidence but rather the proper formulation of the
pleadings, knowledge on the part of the moving party should
not be a bar. The better rule in the State courts, of course,
has been that the purpose of a bill of particulars is to discover
what the plaintiff claims the facts to be and that it is imna20
terial that the moving party has knowledge of the facts.
"If an order for a bill of particulars is not obeyed" the
Rule provides that the court may strike the pleading to which
the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
The courts have interpreted this provision differently.
We find one court holding that a motion to dismiss the
action is proper; 21 another court holding that the appropriate motion is to strike the pleading and not to non-suit
22
the delinquent party nor to strike the bill of particulars;
and another court holding that the motion should be one to
strike out the non-complying portions of the bill of particulars2 3
Since the motion under Rule 12 (e) is to make the complaint more definite, an order striking the non-complying portions of the bill of particulars does not seem very efficacious.
It is submitted that an order dismissing the action in the
ordinary case is too drastic; all that should be done is to
strike the allegations of the pleading, of which a bill of particulars was ordered and not properly furnished, which in
some cases, of course, may lead to the dismissal of the
complaint.
(E. D. Pa. 1941); Louisiana Farmers' P. U., Inc. v. G. A. & P. Tea Co.,
31 F. Supp. 483 (E. D. Ark. 1940) ; Saxton v. W. S. Askew Co., 35 F. Supp.

519 (N. D. Ga. 1940); Jacobs v Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co., 33 F. Supp. 206
(W. D. La. 1940); Thayer v. Reindl, 1 F. R. D. 528 (W. D. Mich. 1940);
Kraft Cor. Containers, Inc. v. Trumbull Asphalt Co., 31 F. Supp. 314 (D.
N. J. 1940); C. F. Simonin's Sons, Inc. v. American Can Co., 30 F. Supp. 901
(E. D. Pa. 1939). Contra: Fleming v. Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp., 5 F. R. S.
12, c. 244-1 (D. of C. 1941); United States v. Griffith Amusement Co., 1
F. R. D. 229 (W. D. Okla. 1940); Smith v. Buckeye Incubator Co., 3 F. R. S.
158 2(S.
D. Ohio 1940).
0
Bjork v. Post & McCord, 125 App. Div. 813, 110 N. Y. Supp. 206 (1st
Dep't 1908); Dwyer v. Slattery, 118 App. Div. 345, 103 N. Y. Supp. 433 (1st
Dep't 1907); Roberts v. Safety Buggy Co., 1 App. Div. 74, 36 N. Y. Supp.

1094 (1st Dep't 1907) ; 3
21
22

1940).

CARMODY,

N. Y.

PRAcTIcE

(Perm. ed. 1930) 2416.

Botkins v. Sorter, 29 F. Supp. 991 (W. D. La. 1939).
Mulloney v. Federal Reserve Bk. of Boston, 1 F. R. D. 153 (D. Mass.

23Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Nat. Carbon Co., Inc., 35 F. Supp.
455 (D. Mass. 1940).
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I
DuPosiTIoNs AND DISCOVERY

A closely related subject-that of Depositions and Discovery 2 4 -constitutes perhaps the most revolutionary reform accomplished by the Federal Rules.
Several years before the effective date of the new Rules,
Mr. Justice Cardozo made this observation: "The law of
discovery has been invested at times with unnecessary mystery. There are few fields where considerations of practical
convenience should play a larger role." 25
Although the New York Court of Appeals in Public National Bank v. Yational City Banki 20 in 1933 reaffirmed its
earlier holding that an examination before trial need not be
restricted to matters upon which the examining party has
the burden of proof, it left the problem to the discretion of
the various judicial departments. Thus no change was effected by this decision and the First and Second Departments
have remained conservative and the Third and Fourth Departments somewhat liberal.
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York has
gone on record in favor of wider examinations before trial
27
and Senator Pack accordingly introduced a bill in Albany
drafted by the Association's Committee on Law Reform
(Charles H. Meyer, Chairman). The measure does not go
quite so far as the Federal Rules but is a step in the right
direction. The Association states that the usefulness and
benefits of examinations before trial are well established and
that the experience under the new Federal Rules justifies the
adoption of at least a less restricted system in the state
courts.
24 Generally, see Pike and Willis, Federal Discovery it; Operation (1940)
7 U. op CHI. L. REv. 297; Pike, The New Federal Deposition--Discovery

Procedure and the Rules of Evidence (1939)

34 IL.

L. REv. 1; Pike and

Willis, The New Federal Deposition--Discovery Procedure (1938) 38 COL. L.
REv. 1179, 1436; Note (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 708; Note (1940) 29 GEo. L. 3.
382; Note (1940) 39 Micir. L. REv. 322; various commentaries in the Federal
Rules Service.
25 Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U. S. 689,

693, 53 Sup. Ct. 736 (1933).
26 261 N. Y. 316, 185 N. E. 395 (1933).
27 S. INT. 494, Pr. 872. The bill unfortunately failed to pass.
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The limitations placed on discovery under the old federal
procedure 28 are well known. Perhaps the general view prevalent in the state courts as well as in the federal courts that
discovery, if available at all, could only be obtained in support of the examining party's case, stems from the general
attitude of Anglo-American procedural law, i.e., the desire
for secrecy and surprise. Furthermore, the argument against
enlarged discovery that has been repeatedly advanced is that
such enlargement would encourage perjury. It is difficult,
however, to see how an examination before trial which is
mutual, not limited by the affirmative case doctrine, broad
enough to bring out the facts, and with proper provision for
the protection of parties and witnesses, can produce such a
result.
"There is no objection that I know why each party should
not know the other's case." Such was the statement made
back in 1887 by William Howard Taft when he was a Superior Court judge in the State of Ohio. 29

It was he who,

as president of the American Bar Association, suggested in
1922 that the Supreme Court write rules uniting the common
law and equity principles of procedure so as to secure one
form of civil action 0 The framers of the Federal Rules have
proceeded on the same assumptions. Thus, Rule 26 provides that not only parties and employees are subject
to examination, but any witness without regard to a
showing of his present o.r prospective unavailability. The
deposition may be taken on oral examination or on
written interrogatories (1) for the purpose of discovery,
(2) for use as evidence in the action, or (3) for both
purposes. Subject to orders for the protection of parties and
deponents [Rule 30 (b) and (d)], the examining party may
28 Cf. the de bene and other deposition provisions of the Revised Statutes;
28 U. S. C. §§ 636, 639-641, 643-648 and 653-655; Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U. S.
533 (1911) ; discovery in equity by way of written interrogatories and production of documents (Equity Rules 47, 54 and 58) ; -Hanks Dental Ass'n v. Int'l
Tooth Crown Co., 194 U. S. 303 (1904) ; Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713 (1885) ;
Hawks v. Yancey, 2 F. (2d) 471 (N. D. Tex. 1924) ; Pressed Steel Car Co. v.
Union Pac. R. R., 241 Fed. 964 (S. D. N. Y. 1917), where Judge Learned
Hand said, after defining the limited scope of a bill of discovery: "Much the
most convenient way would be for the parties to agree upon a master and allow
plaintiff an oral examination. This, however, I cannot compel."
29 Shaw v. Ohio Edison Co., 9 Ohio Decision's Reprint 809, 812 (1887).
30 Ilsen, PreliminaryDraft of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1937) 11
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 212, 213.
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delve into all relevant matter not privileged relating (1) to
the claim or defense of the examining party, or (2) to the
claim or defense of any other party including (a) the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location
of any books, documents or other tangible things, and (b) the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant
facts. Examination and cross-examination of deponents may
proceed in the manner permissible at the trial under Rule
43 (b). The adverse party, or if a corporation, partnership
or association, its officers, may be interrogated by leading
questions. They may be contradicted or impeached; and also
may be cross-examined by the adverse party, but only upon
the subject matter of their examination in chief.
The Rule on its face provides for complete mutuality of
discovery and permits such discovery not only for use as evidence at the trial but also solely for discovery, and in one of
the first cases construing this Rule, Judge Moscowitz very
properly commented as follows:
For years students of procedure have awaited the day when a
somewhat antiquated system of Federal procedure might be supplanted by a more facile, less rigid structure better adapted to the

swift and just disposition of legal disputes. * * *
Construed together [26(a) and 26(b)], these two clauses permit the broadest type of examination. Limitations which have been
placed upon deposition-taking by state courts, such as the necessity of

having the affirmative upon the issue on which examination is sought,
find no basis in the new Rules. It will not avail a party to raise the
familiar cry of "fishing expedition". * * * The purpose of the examination contemplated by these Rules is to narrow the issues, promote
justice, and thus not make the trial of a law suit a game of chance or
wits. It is in that spirit that these new Rules should be construed.3 1
This expression of liberality is also found in a number
of other cases, 32 and truly represents the purpose of the Rules,
31

1938).2

Laverett v. Continental Briar Pipe Co., 25 F. Supp. 80 (E. D. N. Y.

3 American Lecithin Co. v. W. A. Cleary Corp., 1 F. R. D. 603 (D. N. J.
1941); Vassardakis v. Parish, 4 F. R. S. 481 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); Sears
Roebuck & Co. v. Harrison, 1 F. R. D. 135 (N. D. Ill. 1940) ; Lewis v. United
Airlines Trans., 27 F. Supp. 946 (D. Conn. 1939); Coca Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola
Lab., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 275 (D. Md. 1939); Pirnie v. Andrews, 1 F. R. D. 252
(S. D. N. Y. 1939); Bough v. Lee, 28 F. Supp. 673 (S. D. N. Y. 1939);
Stankewicz v. Pillsbury Flour Mills Co., 26 F. Supp. 1003 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ;
Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Burger, 27 F. Supp. 556 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ;
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but there are other cases which reveal the influence of the
old federal discovery practice and the restrictive discovery
procedure in some states. 3 Indeed, we find Judge Hulbert
3 4
saying in Schweinert v. Insurance Co. of North Americm:

After all that has been written in the interpretation of the new
Rules, it is surprising that there should be so much confusion in their
operation.

It is not clear whether the learned Judge was attributing
this confusion solely to lawyers or whether the courts were
also included in his statement.
There is in addition to the oral and written discovery
procedure provided in Rule 26 a further method of discovery
to be found in Rule 33. This rule is limited to parties and

provides for the service upon any adverse party of interrogatories to be answered by the party served. The note of
the Advisory Committee says that Rule 33 restates the substance of Equity Rule 58 with qualifications to conform to
the Federal Rules. Since Rule 33 is silent as to the scope
of the examination, the contention was made that Rule 33
was to be construed like old Equity Rule 58. This argument
was promptly rejected, the courts holding that the scope of
the examination under Rule 33 should be the same as defined in Rule 26.15

However, certain limitations have been

Kingsway Press, Inc. v. Farrell Pub. Co., 30 F. Supp. 775 (S. D. N. Y. 1939);
Newcomb v. Universal Match Corp., 27 F. Supp. 937 (E. D. N. Y. 1939);
Fox v. House, 29 F. Supp. 673 (E. D. Okla. 1939) ; cf. Nat. Bondholders Corp.
v. McClintic, 99 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
33 See, for instance, Poppino v. Jones Store Co., 1 F. R. D. 215 (W. D.
Mo. 1940); Sonken-Galamba Corp. v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry., 30 F. Supp.
936 (W. D. Mo. 1939) ; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 1 F. R. D.
62 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Kenealy v. Texas 'Co., 29 F. Supp. 502 (S. D. N. Y.
1939) ; and comment in Chandler v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 453, 454
(E. D. Wis. 1940).
34 1 F. R. D. 247 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
3
5 Fleming v. Bernardi, 1 F. R. D. 624 (N. D. Ohio 1941); Fox v. Fisher,
4 F. R. S. 515 (E. D. Tenn. 1941); Munzer v. Swedish-American Line, 35
F. Supp. 493 (S. D. N. Y. 1940); J. Schoeneman, Inc. v. Brauer, 1 F. R. D.
292 (W. D. Mo. 1940) ; Byers Theaters, Inc. v. Murphy, 1 F. R. D. 286 (W. D.
Va. 1940); Chandler v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 453 (E. D. Wis.
1940); Landry v. O'Hara Vessels, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 423 (D. Mass. 1939);
Auer v. Hershey Creamery Co., 1 F. R. D. 14 (D. N. J. 1939); Kingsway
Press, Inc. v. Farrell Pub. Corp., 30 F. Supp. 775 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); E. I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Byrnes, 1 F. 1. D. 34 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Dixon
v. Phifer, 30 F. Supp. 627 (W. D. S. C. 1939); Boysell Co. v. Colonial
Coverlet Co., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 122 (E. D. Tenn. 1939); Nichols v. Sanborn
Co., 24 F. Supp. 908 (D. Mass. 1938).
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prescribed by some courts. Judge Chesnut in Coca-Cola v.
Dixi-Cola Lab., Inc.,.3 6 has stated:
* * * that it will be only the exceptional case where more than 15 or
20 interrogatories can conveniently and efficiently be submitted. Where

a more comprehensive examination of the adverse party is desired, it
should ordinarily be done by taking his deposition.

Judge Reeves, however, in J. Schoeneman, Inc. v.
Brauer,37 has held as follows:
Rule No. 33 of the Rules of Federal Procedure, *** has been
interpreted by the courts as being just as broad in its implications as
in the case of depositions. This means that the distinction between a
search for evidentiary facts and an inquiry into ultimate facts has been
abolished.
It makes no difference, therefore, how many interrogatories are

propounded. If the inquiries are pertinent the opposing party cannot
complain.
The question has come up whether the fact that the matters concerning which discovery is sought are within the
knowledge of a party seeking discovery should be a bar to
discovery. An answer in the negative seems proper. At
least one of the objects of deposition procedure under the
Rules is the shortening and simplification of trials. Knowledge of the facts by a party does not prove his case. He must
obtain and submit proof of these facts and deposition testimony may well help to supply such proof. Othervise, he
may have to resort to other proof at the trial which may entail considerable trouble and expense in its production. The
courts for the Northern and Western Districts of New York,
however, have held that the examination must be confined to
facts unknown to the examining party.3 8
The preferable view would seem to be that of Judge
36 30 F. Supp. 275 (D. Md. 1939) ; to the same effect, Chemical Foundation,
Inc. v. Universal-Cyclops Steel Corp., 1 F. R. D. 533 (W. D. Pa. 1941) ; New
England Terminal Co. v. Graves Tank & Mfg. Corp., 1 F. R. D. 411 (D. R. I.
1940).
7 1 F. R. D. 292 (W. D. Mo. 1940).
8s B. B. Chemical Co. v. Cataract Chemical Co., 25 F. Supp. 472 (W. D.
N. Y. 1938), where the learned judge said, "Answer was not required under
the old rule [Equity Rule 58] * * * and it should not under the new"; Norton
v. Cooper Jarrett, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 92 (N. D. N. Y. 1938); see also Babcock &
Wilcox v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 25 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del. 1938).
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59
Mandelbaum in Kingsway Press,Inc. v. FarrellPub. Corp.,
where he held that interrogatories under Rule 33 are not limited to matters solely within the knowledge of the adverse
party, and that of Judge Campbell of the same district,40
who has held that the fact that the items called for are or
should be within the knowledge of the moving party does not
constitute a valid objection to an interrogatory.
It would seem that in this instance, at least, the state
judges in the Third and Fourth Departments and the federal judges for southern New York display a liberal attitude
while the state judges in the southern part of the state and
the federal judges in northern and western New York tend
to a narrow view.
A problem upon which the courts have expressed rather
divergent opinions is this: May discovery be had of matters which may be inadmissible as original evidence? Rule
26 (b) justifies an affirmative answer. This Rule, as previously mentioned, seems clearly to indicate a twofold purpose, one of which is to aid the examining party to prepare
for trial without limitations on such examination except
those of relevancy and privilege. Judge Hincks of the District of Connecticut in Lewis v. United Airlines Transporttion Corp.,4 1 has held that Rule 26
* * * contemplates examination not merely for the narrow purpose of
adducing testimony which shall be offered in evidence at the trial, but
also for the broad discovery of information which may be useful in
preparation for trial. * * * The only limitation is to matters "relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action" * * * The examination, under the rule, is not to be restricted to matters which are
material or admissible.

Judge Hincks is not alone in giving this proper construction
to Rule 26.42
8930
F. Supp. 775 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
40
Nakken Patents Corp. v. Rabinowitz, 1 F. R. D. 90 (E. D. N. Y. 1940);
see also Benevento v. A. & P. Food Stores, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 424 (E. D. N. Y.
1939) and Samuel Goldwyn v. United Artists Corp., 35 F. Supp. 633 (S. D.
N. Y. 1940); American S.S. Co. v. Buckeye S.S. Co., 1 F. R. D. 773 (W. D.
N. Y. 1941).
4127
F. Supp. 946 (D. Conn. 1939).
42
American Lecithin Co. v. W. A. Cleary Corp., 1 F. R. D. 603 (D. N. J.
1941); Laird v. United Shipyards, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 772 (S. D. N. Y. 1941);
Steingut v. Guaranty Trust, 1 F. R. D. 723 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); Byers Thea-
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There are, however, a number of apparently contrary decisions making admissibility in
43

evidence the controlling

factor.

The objection of irrelevancy has been frequently sustained where the answers will require the expressions of opinion. This is particularly noticeable in patent suits where
one party asks in effect in what manner he is infringing on
the other's patent. The reasons for the refusal are not given
44
by the courts.

However, a few patent decisions have allowed interrogatories which might technically be considered as calling for
expressions of opinion. In the Eastern District of New York
it has been held in a patent suit that where the answer pleads
failure to comply with the statute or rule, the plaintiff is
entitled to ascertain by interrogatories in which respect he
was deemed to have failed to comply, and also that a defendant may be required to point out the defect or act to which
45
the defense is directed.
Questions in negligence actions as to what constituted
contributory negligence have also been deemed improper
ters, Inc. v. Murphy, 1 F. R. D. 286 (W. D. Va. 1940); Pirnie v. Andrews,
1 F. IL D. 252 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Kingsway Press, Inc. v. Farrell Pub. Co.,
30 F. Supp. 775 (S. D. N Y. 1939); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Burger,
27 F. Supp. 556 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Harrison, 1 F.
R. D. 135 (N. D. Ill. 1939); Fox v. House, 29 F. Supp. 673 (E. D. Okla.
1939).
43 See, for instance, Poppino v. Jones Store Co., 1 F. R. D. 215 (W. D.
Mo. 1940); Rose Silk Mills v. Ins. Co. of North America, 29 F. Supp. 504
(S. D. N. Y. 1939); Fletcher v. Foremost Dairies, 29 F. Supp. 744 (E. D.
N. Y. 1939); cf. Benevento v. A. & P. Stores, 26 F. Supp. 424 (E. D. N. Y.
1939).4
A few of the cases on this point are: Nakken Patents Corp. v. Rabinowitz, 1 F. R. D. 90 (E. D. N. Y. 1940); Chandler v. Cutler-Hammer Co., 31
F. Supp. 453 (E. D. Wis. 1940); Stanley Works v. C. S. Mersick & Co.,
1 F. R. D. 43 (D. Conn. 1939); Thomas French & Sons, Ltd. v. Carleton
Venetian Blind Co., 30 F. Supp. 903 (E. D. N. Y. 1939) (where, however, we
find the statement in allowing certain interrogatories: they "may technically be
considered as calling for an opinion, but that is true as to everything we see, if
called upon to describe it, as we must form an opinion as to what we hear and
see, but considered in the broader and more liberal sense, these interrogatories
do not call for the opinion of the one answering but only what he saw and
understood."); Teller v. Montgomery Ward Co., 27 F. Supp. 938 (E. D. Pa.
1939); Boysell Co. v. Colonial Coverlet Co., 29 F. Supp. 122 (E. D. Tenn.
1939); Babcock & Wilcox v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 25 F. Supp. 596
(D. Del. 1938).
45 Dugan v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 902 (E. D. N. Y.
1940); Pierce v. Submarine Signal Co., 25 F. Supp. 862 (D. Mass. 1939);
MclInerney v. Wm. P. McDonald Const. Co., 28 F. Supp. 557 (E. D. N. Y.
1939); Schwartz v. Howard Hosiery Co., 27 F. Supp. 443 (E. D. Pa. 1939).
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either on the ground that they call for an expression of opinion,4 6 or on the ground that such a question is an ultimate
4
issue in the case and would not be admissible at the trial. 7
Thus far we have not considered the problem of the
production of documents. There are two methods by which
documents may be required to be produced: (1) by subpoena
duces tecum, which is provided for in a rather backhanded
way in Rule 45 (d) (1) which says, "A subpoena commanding the production of documentary evidence on the taking
of a deposition shall not be used without an order of the
court"; no express mention is made in Rule 26(a) of the
production of documents or the subpoena duces tecum., the
only provision being that "the attendance of witnesses may
be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule
45"; and (2) by order under Rule 34, the main discovery
and inspection rule, which bears similarity to Section 324 of
the New York Civil Practice Act.
When documents are sought to be produced under Rule
26 and Rule 45, Rule 34 must also be considered since, as
first stated, there is no express provision in Rule 26 for the
production of documents.
Rule 34 so far as applicable to this discussion provides
that upon motion of any party on notice to all other parties
the court may order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing of any designated
documents, papers, etc., not privileged which constitute or
contain evidence materialto any matter involved in the action
and which are in his possession, custody or control. Thus,
we have the problem: When a subpoena duces tecum under
Rule 45 is sought in conjunction with an examination under
Rule 26, is Rule 26 which stresses relevancy to be read in
conjunction with Rule 34 which refers to matters which constitute or contain evidence, and if so which Rule shall modify
the other?
In an oral ruling during the course of the trial of United
States v. Aluminum Corp.,48 Judge Caffey held (1) that Rule
46

1939).
47

Doucette v. Eastern States Transp. Co., Inc., 1 F. R. D. 66 (D. Mass.

Tudor v. Leslie, 1 F. R. D. 448 (D. Mass. 1940).

1 F. R. D. 62 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); see also same case 26 F. Supp. 711,
712, where the learned judge stated: "I conclude, therefore, that it is essential
48
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45 (b) must be interpreted in pari materia with Rule 34, and
(2) that the documents called for by the subpoena dues
tecum must constitute and contain evidence which is material or probably material. The contention was made that
the evidence called for would be useful in refreshing the
recollection of the witness. 49 Judge Caffey said:
As I see it, the usefulness of a document for the purpose of
refreshing the memory of a witness is no ground whatsoever for
requiring its production. * * * the rules restrict the power of the
court inrespect to enforcing such production by means of a subpoena
duces tecum, to documents which are or probably are evidence. Their
value for refreshing recollection is wholly outside the definition of the
sole authority of the court to compel their production. [Citing People
ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court of State of New York, 245 N. Y. 24,
156 N. E.84 (1927), and Kring v. State of Missouri, 107 U. S. 221,
2 Sup. Ct. 443 (1883).]
It is true that this application for a subpoena duces
tecum was made at the trial under Rule 45 (b) and was not
made under Rule 45 (d) (1) which provides for the issuance
of a subpoena duces tecum on the taking of a deposition
under Rule 26. But this difference is probably not material.
Judge Leibell, however, in Bough v. Lee,50 has indicated that
where a subpoena duces tecun is issued in conjunction with
the taking of a deposition, the only question to be determined
was the relevancy of the documents and whether they were
privileged or not. And the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has held that where it appears on the trial
that a state statute permits a witness to refresh his memory
by reference to certain types of documents, such a statute is
applicable in the federal courts under Rule 43a and the court
may order the production of such documents for that
purpose.5 1
that I examine every document before determining, and that by such examination I determine, whether it may properly be inspected by the government".
(Production was by subpoena duces tecum on the trial, but the court relied on
Rule 34); another decision by Judge Caffey in the same case is reported in
1 F. R. D. 57.
49 Cf. N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 296, which permits the production of documents for the purpose of refreshing a witness's recollection on an examination
before trial, and N. Y. City Car Advertising Co. v. E. Regensburg & Sons,
Inc., 205 App. Div. 705, 200 N. Y. Supp. 152 (1st Dep't 1923).
5028 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. N. Y. 1939).
51 United States v. Smith, 117 F. (2d) 911 (1941).
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As for the second method of compelling production of

documents-by order of court under Rule 34-there appears
to be no doubt but that the applicant for the production
of documents under this Rule must (1) designate the
documents sought with reasonable particularity, and (2)
show that the documents are in the possession, custody
or control of the party against whom the application is
made.52 The third requisite, namely to show that the documents are "evidence material to any matter involved in the
action" has received various interpretations.
Is relevancy sufficient or is admissibility in evidence
essential under Rule 34?
58

Judge Coxe in Kenealy v. Tewas

has adhered to the strict admissibility in evidence rule,
holding:
Co.

* * * The plaintiff says that he should be permitted to have the
statements in order that he may properly cross-examine the various
witnesses as they are produced. This is substantially the argument
advanced and rejected by Chief Judge Cardozo in People ex rel.
Lemon v. Supreme Court, * * * and I do not think that it is even
open under the language of Rule 34.
52 United Mercantile Agencies v. Silver Fleet Motor Express, Inc., 1
F. R. D. 709 (W. D. Ky. 1941) ; Peltz v. Carolina Bagging Co., 1 F. R. D. 443
(S. D. N. Y. 1940) ; Vendola Corp. v. Hershey Chocolate Corp., 1 F. R. D. 359
(S. D. N. Y. 1940); Gill v. Col-Tex Refining Co., 1 F. R. D. 255 (S. D. Tex.
1940); Sonken-Galamba Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 30 F. Supp. 936
(W. D. Mo. 1939); Thomas French & Son, Ltd. v. Carleton Venetian Blind
Co., 30 F. Supp. 903 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
5329 F. Supp. 502 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); see also Barwick v. Powell, 1
F. R. D. 604 (S. D. N. Y. 1941) ; Poppino v. Jones Store Co., 1 F. R. D. 215
(W. D. Mo. 1940); Slydell v. Capital Transit Co., 1 F. R. D. 15 (D. of C.
1939); Floridin Co. v. Attapulgus Clay Co., 26 F. Supp. 968 (D. Del. 1939);
Sonken-Galamba Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 30 F. Supp. 936 (W. D.
Mo. 1939) ; ef. under N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 324, United Mercantile Agencies
v. Silver Fleet Motor Express, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 709 (W. D. Ky. 1941);
materiality to issues must be determined by ihe court first inspecting the documents; cf. decisions under Rule 26 by Judge Caffey in United States v. Aluininurn Co., 26 F. Supp. 711 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) and the New York cases under
§ 324 of the N. Y. Civil Practice Act holding that documents must be admissible
in evidence on the trial and material to the issues; People ex -el. Lemon v.
v. Supreme Court, 245 N. Y. 24, 156 N. E. 84 (1927) ; Matter of Smathers, 152
Misc. 774, 274 N. Y. Supp. 109 (Surr. Ct. West. Cty. 1934) ; Marx v. Merchants
Nat. Properties, Inc., 148 Misc. 6, 265 N. Y. Supp. 136 (N. Y. Cty. Spec. T.
1933); Bergelt v. Roberts, 144 Misc. 832, 258 N. Y. Supp. 905 (N. Y. Cty.
Spec. T. 1932), aff'd without opinion, 236 App. Div. 777, 258 N. Y. Supp. 905
(1st Dep't 1932); Bencoe v. McDonnell, 210 App. Div. 123, 205 N. Y. Supp.
343 (2d Dep't 1924), aff'd without opinion, 183 App. Div. 923 (4th Dep't 1918) ;
Murphy v. Keenan, 101 Misc. 443, 167 N. Y. Supp. 55 (Monroe Cty. Spec. T.
1917); Falco v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 161 App. Div. 735, 146 N. Y. Supp.
1024 (2d Dep't 1914).
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I realize that there are expressions to the contrary in a number
of recent District Court cases, Bough v. Lee, S. D. N. Y., March 28,
1939, 28 F. Supp. 673; Bough v. Lee, S. D. N. Y., June 24, 1939,
29 F. Supp. 498; Kulich v. Murray, S. D. N. Y., June 13, 1939, 28
F. Supp. 675; Price v. Levitt, E. D. N. Y., Aug. 18, 1939, 29 F.
Supp. 165; and although I have great respect for the opinions of the
judges who decided those cases, I still think that statements such as
the ones now in question are without the letter as well as the spirit of
Rule 34. * * *
The simple relevancy requirement was applied by Judge
Hincks of the District of Connecticut in the case of Connecticut Importing Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp.5 4 In
that case the plaintiff had alleged in its complaint that it
had sustained damages and loss of profits as a result of the
unlawful acts by the defendant beginning in January, 1937.
On the issue of damages the defendant demanded production
of copies of plaintiff's income tax returns, both before and
after that time. The court held:
On this issue of damages surely the plaintiff's income both before
and after the critical time is highly relevant, and plaintiff's tax returns
normally might be expected to contain information as to such income.
The court then holds that Rules 34 and 45 must be construed
in pari materiawith Rule 26 disapproving of Judge Caffey's
distinction between probable materiality and relevancy and
goes on to say:
the returns might conceivably be admissible, if offered by the defendant, as admissions contradicting certain aspects of the plaintiff's
proofs. Similarly they might prove useful to the defendant on the
cross-examination of plaintiff's witnesses.
Another recent case which necessarily implies that Rules
26 and 34 are to be construed together is Macicerer v. N. Y.
Central B. B. 55 There the plaintiff alleged that the intes(D. Conn. 1940).
a5 1 F. R. D. 408 (E. D. N. Y. 1940); see also Quemos Theatre Co., Inc.
v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949 (D. N. J. 1940); Compagnie
15 1 F. P_ D. 190

Continentale D'Importation v. Pacific Argentine Brazil Line, Inc., 1 F. R. D.
388 (S. D. N. Y. 1940); Creden v. Central R. K. of N. J., 1 F. R. D. 168
(E. D. N. Y. 1940); E. W. Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal Process Co., 1 F. R. D. 193
N. D. Ohio 1940); Byers Theaters v. Murphy, 1 F. R. D. 286 (W. D. Va.
1940); Beler v. Savarona Ship Corp., 26 F. Supp. 599 (E. D. N. Y. 1939);

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 16

tate's death was caused by the overturning of a steam crane
which he was operating while in the defendant's employ and
demanded production of all papers and records showing repairs made to the steam crane subsequent to the accident.
These documents, of course, would be inadmissible as part
of the plaintiff's case at trial. Judge Moscowitz allowed
plaintiff's request, saying:
It cannot be decided as a matter of law in advance of the trial
that the subject of plaintiff's inquiries is wholly irrelevant or immaterial. It is possible as contended by plaintff that the repairs which
were made after the accident disclose certain defects in the crane which
by their very nature will appear to have been in existence before the
accident. Furthermore, it is conceivable that such documents might
be used to rebut defendant's evidence. See Choctaw, Oklahoma &
Gulf Railroad Company v. McDade, 191 U. S. 64, 24 S. Ct. 24, 48
L. Ed. 96. It is possible that such evidence might be admissible for
other reasons.
It is submitted that when the production of documents
is sought, whether under Rule 45 in conjunction with Rule
26 or under Rule 34, all these Rules should be read together.
Accordingly, it is proper to construe the meaning of the
words to be found in Rule 34, namely, "not privileged which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action" in the light of the relevancy provision
contained in Rule 26 (b). Furthermore, the words "any matter involved in the action" seem to be rather broad and flexible and should be given some effect. Fine distinctions between probable materiality and relevancy should not be
recognized.5
Whether documents can be required to be produced
under Rule 33 seems problematical. There are a few cases
which have allowed a limited production, 7 but the normal
Bough v. Lee, 28 F. Supp. 673 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Fox v. House, 29 F. Supp.
673 (E.D. Okla. 1939).
56 See Note (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 708. But cf. Commentary 4 F. R. S.

919.

5'R. C. A. Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Decca Records, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 433 (S.D.
N. Y. 1940); Chandler v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Wis.
1940); Dixon v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 797 (W. D. La. 1939);
Coca Cola v. Dixi-Cola Lab., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 275 (D. Md. 1939); E. I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Byrnes, 1 F. R. D. 34 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
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method would be under Rules 26 or 34.11
A number of decisions have been handed down, chiefly
involving negligence cases, where attempts have been made
to examine affidavits and similar materials secured by another party by independent investigation incident to the
preparation of the latter's case for trial. The courts have
as a general rule denied such applications. Judge Moscowitz
in Mcarthy v. Palmer,9 held as follows:
To use them in such a manner would penalize the diligent and place a
premium on laziness. It is fair to assume that, except in the most
unusual circumstances, no such result was intended.
In Frenc v. Zalstem-Zalessky, 0 Judge Hulbert laid
down the same rule and refused to require witnesses to produce the inter-office correspondence file, but gave this

warning:
I confine my ruling, however, upon this point to this particular case
lest it might become the practice to conceal information which might
otherwise be obtainable, in the inter-office correspondence file, on the
supposition that it would thus not be subject to production. 61

Furthermore, it has been properly held under Rule 33
that interrogatories which require a party to make investigations, research or compilation of data for his adversary are
62
improper.
The right to physical and mental examinations is also
covered by the Rules.
Physical examinations are permitted in a number of
58
Gaumond v. Spector Motor Service, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 364 (D. Mass.
1940); O'Rourke v. R. K_ 0. Radio Pictures, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 996 (D. Mass.
1939).
59 29 F. Supp. 585 (E. D. N. Y. 1939); State of Maryland for use of
Montvila v. Pan-Amer. Bus Lines, 1 F. R. D. 213 (D. Md. 1940); Florindin
Co. v. Attapulgus Clay Co., 26 F. Supp. 968 (D. Del. 1939) ; but consider the
apparently contrary holding in Seligson v. Camp Westover, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 733
(S. D. N. Y. 1941).
60 1 F. R. D. 240 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
61 See also Courteau v. Interlake S.S. Co., 1 F. R. D. 525 (W. D. Mich.
1941); Caraballo v. Export S.S. Corp., 3 F. R. S. 387 (S. D. N. Y. 1940);
Schweinert v. Ins. Co. of N. Amer., 1 F. R. D. 247 (S. D. N. Y. 1940);
Piorkowski v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 1 F. R. D. 407 (M. D. Pa. 1940);
Murphy v. N. Y. & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 27 F. Supp. 878 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
62 See, for instance, Chemical Foundation, Inc. v. Universal-Cyclops Steel
Corp., 1 F. R. D. 533 (W. D. Pa. 1941); Byers Theaters, Inc. v. Murphy,
1 F. R. D. 286 (W. D. Va. 1940). But see R. C. A. Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Decca
Records, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 433 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
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states and under the Conformity Act and the decision of the
U. S. Supreme Court in Camden Suburban Ry. v. Stetson 6'
were allowed in personal injury actions in the federal courts
embracing New York State, since the enactment of the Civil
Practice Act permitting a physical examination without oral
testimony.6 4 Rule 35, however, does not deal solely with
ph$ysicc4 examinations but also permits mentaZ examinations.
The examination also is not confined to personal injury cases.
In fact, the Rule states that "in an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is in controversy, the
court * * * may order him to submit to a physical or mental
examination by a physician." Blood grouping tests have
already been permitted under Rule 35 by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in a matrimonial case
involving the parentage of a child who was not strictly a
party.

66

The U. S. Supreme Court in Sibbach v. WMlson & Co.,
Inc., 66 on January 13, 1941, Mr. Justice Roberts writing the
majority opinion, held that Rule 35 is a regulation of procedure, not a matter of substance, and therefore within the
authority conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Enabling
Act and, also, not an invasion of freedom from personal restraint. The Court accordingly upheld the lower courts in
directing a physical examination of the plaintiff. Four justices dissented, making the final count Justices Roberts,
McReynolds, Hughes, Stone and Reed versus Justices Frankfurter, Black, Douglas and Murphy.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the four-man minority, argued that a drastic change in public policy "in a
177 U. S. 172, 20 Sup. Ct. 617 (1900).
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 306; Disalvo v. American Brass Co., 20 F. Supp.
136 (W. D. N. Y. 1937); Bailey v. Texas Co., 34 F. (2d) 829 (E. D. N. Y.
1929).65
Beach v. Beach, 114 F. (2d) 479 (1940); cf. N. Y. Civ. Pt Ac. AcT
§ 306-a authorizing blood-grouping tests whenever relevant to the prosecution
or defense of an action or proceeding and Hayt v. Brewster, Gordon & Co.,
63

64

199 App. Div. 68; 191 N. Y. Supp. 176 (4th Dep't 1921), decided before the
enactment of C. P. A. § 306-a, where the court directed a blood-grouping test
on the ground that the words "physical examination" were broad enough to
include a medical examination embracing blood-grouping tests; on the question
whether a district court on a motion for a new trial may require the appellee to
submit to a mental or physical examination, see Teche Lines, Inc. v. Boyette,
111 F. (2d) 579 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940).
68312 U. S.1, 61 Sup. Ct. 422 (1941).
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matter deeply touching the sensibilities of people or even
their prejudices as to privacy ought not to be inferred from
a general authorization to formulate rules," and concluded
that the change introduced by Rule 35 required explicit
legislation.
To a New York lawyer the conclusion reached by Mr.
Justice Roberts seems clearly sound and "the inviolability
of a person" argument of Mr. Justice Frankfurter is not persuasive. An order for a physical examination is merely for
the purpose of ascertaining facts and therefore seems to be
no more drastic than an ordinary order for discovery and
inspection which is also intended to attain that objective.
The problems of constitutional immunity from self-incrimi7
nation and invasion of personal privacy are not involved.
Several other matters concerning the subject of depositions should here be considered. As mentioned above, the
depositions of witnesses may be taken without regard to a
showing of their present or prospectiv, availability-quite
different from the circumscribed practice under the New
York Civil Practice Act. It is only when the use of a deposition is in question that the availability of a witness comes
to the foreground. This is clearly set forth in paragraph (d)
of Rule 26, which outlines in detail when the testimony taken
before trial may be offered in evidence at the trial.
Furthermore, at the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a
deposition so far as admissible under the rules of evidence
may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had notice
thereof, subject, of course, to the availability requirements
set forth in Rule 26(d), reference to which has just been
made. Thus, the problem presented in New York State courts
is obviated where it has been held that while a deposition of
a party may be read in evidence upon the trial against him
as being an admission against interest, it cannot be read
against a co-defendant unless such co-defendant had plain
notice that it would be read against him. Mere service of the
notice or of the motion on the co-defendant has not been
67 Blood-Grouping Tests and the Constitutional Immunity Against SelfIncriminationand PersonalPrivacy (1941) 1 THE BiLL OF RIGHTS REv. 226.
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deemed sufficient. Otherwise, it has been said in New York
that as to the co-defendant the defendant was being examined
as a witness only. 8
The amendments proposed by the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, to which reference has already
been made, 69 were expected to remove this problem in New
York.
The notice to take the deposition need not,70 and, it is
submitted, should not state the matters upon which the
examination is sought.
The name and address of the person sought to be examined if known, and, if the name is not known a general
description sufficient to identify him must be given in the
deposition notice. It has been held that a notice stating that
a deposition would be taken of "such other officer or officers
as may have knowledge of the facts" is defective in that it
does not sufficiently identify such persons. 71 The name of the
person before whom the deposition is to be taken need not be
given, 72 although one case has unnecessarily held that it was
7
better practice to do so. 3
Contrary to the New York State rule which holds that a
municipality which is a party to an action may not be examined before trial,7 4 the federal courts under the new rules
68 Simpson v. Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc., 249 App. Div. 827, 292 N. Y.
Supp. 84 (2d Dep't 1937); Van Schaick v. Sullivan, 241 App. Div. 268, 271
N. Y. Supp. 537 (1st Dep't 1934); Nixon v. Beacon Transportation Co., 239
App. Div. 830, 264 N. Y. Supp. 114 (2d Dep't 1933) ; it has, however, been held
that failure to give such express notice to a co-defendant does not deny to
such co-defendant the right to appear and participate in the examination;
Freisinger v. Reibach, et al., 254 App. Div'. 575, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 817 (2d Dep't
1938).

69 Cf. note 27, supra.

70 Rule 30(a); Spaeth v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 729
(S. D. N. Y. 1941); Madison v. Cobb, 29 F. Supp. 881 (M. D. Pa. 1939);
Bennett v. The Westover, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 10 (S. D. N. Y. 1938) ; Saviolis v.
Nat. Bk. of Greece, 25 F. Supp. 966 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).
71 Cohen v. Penn. R. R., 30 F. Supp. 419 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Freeman v.
Hotel Waldorf-Astoria Corp., 27 F. Supp. 303 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Orange
County Theatres, Inc. v. Levy, 26 F. Supp. 416 (S. D. N. Y? 1938); Conn v.
Hengerer Co., 152 Misc. 201, 273 N. Y. Supp. 148 (Sup. Ct Erie Co. 1934) ;
in accord, Bartholomay Co., Inc. v. Regan, 123 Misc. 489, 205 N. Y. Supp. 745
(Sup. Ct Monroe Co. 1924).
72 Rule 30(a).
73 Norton v. Cooper Jarrett, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 92 (N. D. N. Y. 1938).
74 Kasitch v. City of Albany, 283 N. Y. 622, 28 N. E. (2d) 30 (1940);
Bush Terminal Co. v. City of New York, 259 N. Y. 509, 182 N. E. 158 (1932).
Since the taking over by New York City of the Subway Transit Lines, an

1941]

DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL PRACTICE

25

have held that a municipality is not immune from exami75
nation.

A subpoena need not be served upon a party whose deposition is sought to be taken to permit a motion to strike his
pleading if he fails to appear, the service of the notice upon
his attorney being sufficient. 76 Of course, a party cannot be
punished for contempt if a subpoena is not served, but the
possible striking out of his pleading, dismissal of the action,
or entry of a default judgment should ordinarily be sufficient
deterrents. 7

However, if documents are to be produced a

78
subpoena duces tecum must be obtained from the court.
On the other hand, the attendance of a witness, including an

can only be compelled
"employee", to appear for discovery
79
by the service of a subpoena.
It has also been held by Judge Hulbert and by Judge

Cooper of the Northern District of New York that it is
improper to set the examination in the office of the attorney
for the examining party. 0 Judge Hulbert suggests that the
examination be made returnable in the regular motion part
and that on the return date the court may then assign the
place in the courthouse where the deposition may be taken.
This requirement seems unnecessarily restrictive. Why canamendment to the New York Civil Practice Act has been made authorizing a
court to grant an order, on notice, providing for the examination of a municipal
corporation before trial on any issue involved in an action arising out of the
ownership, operation or maintenance of a public utility by the municipal corporation or its transferor or assignor. The new law also applies to pending
actions and causes of action which have heretofore accrued. N. Y. CIV. PRAC.
Acr § 292-a. "Public utility" has been held to embrace utilities as defined by the
New York Public Service Law when such utilities are operated by municipalities. Olsen v. City of New York, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 426 (1941).
75 Conneway v. City of New York, 32 F. Supp. 54 (E. D. N. Y. 1940);

Joy Mfg. Co. v. City of New York, 30 F. Supp. 403 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).

76 Rules 30(a) and 37(d) ; Spaeth v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1 F. R.
D. 729 (S. D. N. Y. 1941) ; French v. Zalstem-Zalessky, 1 F. R. D. 240 (S. D.
N. Y. 1940); Havell v. Time, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 439 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
77 Rule 37(d) ; Millinocket Theatre, Inc. v. Kurson, 35 F. Supp. 754 (D.
Me. 1940); French v. Zalstem-Zalessky, 1 F. R. D. 240 (S. D. N. Y. 1940);
Cohn v. Annunziata, 27 F. Supp. 805 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Madison v. Cobb,
29 F. Supp. 881 (M. D. Pa. 1939) ; cf. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 299.
78 Rule 45 (d) ; cf. local rules S. D. N. Y. and E. D. N. Y. Civil Rule 15;
Cooney v. Guild Co., 1 F. R. D. 246 (S. D. N. Y. 1940) ; Whitaker v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 1 F. R. S. 541 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
79 Freeman v. Hotel Waldorf-Astoria Corp., 27 F. Supp. 303 (S. D. N. Y.
1939); Spaeth v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 729 (S. D. N. Y.
1941).
80
H avell v. Time, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 439 (S. D. N. Y. 1940); Norton v.
Cooper Jarrett, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 92 (N. D. N. Y. 1938).
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not the examination be held in the office of the attorney for
the examining party if the testimony is taken before and
under the supervision of an officer properly qualified under
Rule 28 (a) and (c)? Ordinarily, holding the examination
at the attorney's office before a properly qualified officer,
would be much more convenient for all persons involved than
going to the courthouse where the facilities for conducting an
examination before trial are rather limited.
Occasionally the courts seem not to keep in mind the
twofold purpose of Rule 26 which gives rise to two types of
cases that must be carefully distinguished. This misleading
failure to distinguish occurred in Dellefield v. Blockdel
Realty Co., 31 where the defendant took plaintiff's deposition
by oral examination. During the examination plaintiff, on
counsel's advice, refused to answer certain questions. The
court, on defendant's motion to punish plaintiff for contempt
for disobeying a subpoena and for an order directing plaintiff to return to the jurisdiction for examination, denied
plaintiff's cross-motion to vacate the subpoena and to terminate the examination and directed plaintiff to appear for
examination.
Although there was nothing in the opinion to indicate
that defendant was taking the deposition only for use as
evidence and not for purposes of discovery, the court, in a
dictum, 82 went on to say that there was an "underlying error"
in the manner of taking the deposition, that plaintiff's refusal
to answer "needlessly complicated the matter" and that the
"questions should have been answered with objections duly
noted." This statement, it is submitted, ignores the distinctions in a deponent's self-protective procedure made necessary by the double purpose of Rule 26 which expressly provides, as previously shown, that depositions may be taken
not only to obtain information "for use as evidence" but also
"for the purpose of discovery * * * or for both purposes." For
purposes of discovery on an oral examination, a deponent is
obligated to testify even though such testimony would be
inadmissible in evidence at the trial or hearing. In general
there are only three limitations upon a party seeking discov8140 F. Supp. 212 (S. D. N. Y. 1941).
821d. at 213.
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ery by oral examination: he is not entitled to information
irrelevant to the subject matter of the action, or information
that is privileged, 83 and only in the exercise of the court's discretion may he obtain knowledge respecting "secret processes,
developments, or research." 84 After the examination has commenced, 85 the only way deponent can rely on these limitations
is by refusal to answer, thereby compelling proponent to
make application to the court if he considers himself entitled
to answers, for once they are given the harm is irreparably
committed.
Considering Article V of the Rules as an entirety, it
seems to contemplate as the proper practice that a deponent
shall refuse to answer if he believes proponent is not entitled
to discovery but shall answer if the only objection is to the
subsequent use of the answer as evidence. If deponent believes the examining party has no right to discovery, he may
apply for an order "that certain matters shall not be inquired
into, or that the examination shall be limited to certain matters, * * * or that secret processes, developmients, or research
need not be disclosed." 86 If the proponent is taking the
deposition only to "annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent" the latter may move to terminate the examination or
87
to limit the scope or the manner of taking the deposition.
Moreover, if dispute as to the propriety of proponent's questions arises during the examination, then upon "demand of
the objecting party or deponent, the taking of the deposition
shall be suspended for the time necessary to" move for a
limitation of the examination. 88 Where deponent merely
refuses to answer without making application to the court,
the proponent has the choice of continuing the examination
83 F. 1_

84

C. P. 26(b).

F. R. C. P. 30(b) ; Lever Bros. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 38

F. Supp. 680 (D.Md. 1941).
85 After service of the notice, any party (except proponent) or the deponent
may move to limit the examination, F. R. C. P. 30(b); Barre-Zueta v. Sword
Steamship Line, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 935 (S.D. N. Y. 1939). However, the
courts seem to prefer that deponent move under F. R C. P. 30(d) as the need
appears during the course of the examination rather than to apply under
F. R. C. P. 30(b) before the examination has commenced, Nekrasoff v. U. S.
Rubber Co., 27 F. Supp. 953 (S.D. N. Y. 1939); Brockway Glass Co. v.
Hartford-Empire Co., 36 F. Supp. 470 (W. D. N. Y. 1941).
86 F. R. C. P. 30(b).
87 F. R. C. P. 30(b), (d).
88 F. R. C. P. 30(d).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.. 16

on other matters or immediately adjourning the examination
while he moves for an order compelling an answer. 89 To prevent these applications from being used for delay and harassment, the courts are given full discretion to impose costs
upon the offending party or witness.90
But if proponent is seeking information for use as evidence, the Rules envisage a different procedure. Rule 30(c)
states that "Evidence objected to shall be taken subject to
the objections" which "shall be noted by the officer upon the
deposition." Where deponent's only objection is that the
knowledge sought, though relevant and not privileged, is
otherwise inadmissible in evidence, no harm is done by giving
immediate answers, inasmuch as such objections may be
made and raled upon at the subsequent trial or hearing."'
Moreover, this course will eliminate unnecessary delay in
the taking of -the deposition.
In view of these provisions, the dictum in the Dellefield
case seems proper only in respect of deponent's refusal to
answer on the ground that the answer could not be used as
evidence. The dictum is contrary to Rules 30 and 37 providing for applications to the court where the objections are
based on the ground that proponent is not entitled to the
information even for purpose of discovery, that is "to prepare for trial" as distinguished from "use on the trial." 92
III
CHOICE OF LAW AND THE FEDERAL RULEs

There are several recent decisions indicating that, in the
matter of state and federal relations generally, the rule of
Erie R. B. v. Tom~pkins,9" may become materially restricted,9 4
89

R. C. P. 37(a).

90 F.R. C. P. 30(d), 37(a).
91 F. R. C. P. 26(e). Objections, including those to the qualification of
the officer taking the deposition, which might be obviated if promptly presented
are waived unless made before or at the taking of the deposition, F. R. C. P.

32(b), (c).

92 Cf. Vassardakis v. Parish, 4 F. R. S. 481 (S. D. N. Y. 1941), "The
purpose of these depositions is to prepare for trial as well as for use on the
trial. In other words, the examination may be exploratory for the purpose of
preparation and investigation, * * *."
93 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938).
94
Doctrine not applicable to tort claims against common carriers in inter-
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but the attack, based on this doctrine, upon the Federal
Rules seems to be increasing. Consequently, it is appropriate
to review the effect upon the Rules of the doctrine that, in
actions maintained in the federal courts because of diversity
of citizenship, the national courts shall look to the law of the
states, decisional as well as statutory, for rules of decision. 95
Although principles of statutory construction and constitutional requirements were relied upon by the Supreme
Court 96 in overruling Swift v. Tyson, 7 it seems a fairly safe
assumption that the more persuasive ground of decision was
the Court's notion of what constituted good judicial statecraft under our dual form of government.9 8 But that was
also the ground of decision in Swift v. Tyson, overruled because the method adopted-creation of a federal common
state commerce that have been subjected to extensive federal regulation, O'Brien
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F. (2d) 539 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940); Illinois
Cent. R. R. v. Moore, 112 F. (2d) 959 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940), rev'd, 312 U. S.
630, 61 Sup. Ct. 754 (1941) without passing upon the question whether, because
of the interstate character of the subject matter of the action, the claim for
relief was to be governed by federal law and not by state law; Vaigneur v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 34 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Tenn. 1940); cf. Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U. S. 538, 540, 61 Sup. Ct. 347, 348,
349 (1941) emphasizing that the claim involved, as in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins,
was based on a tort. But see Geist v. Prudence Realization Corp., 122 F. (2d)
503 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), Frank, C. J.dissenting, p. 507.
95 On claims for relief in civil actions, which historically would be classified
as actions at law, relevant state statutes are controlling, JuoicARy AcT oF
1789, c. 20, § 34, 1 STAT. 92, REv. STAT. § 721, 28 U. S. C. § 725; see Swift v.
Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 17-18, 10 L. ed. 865 (U. S. 1842). Now on such claims,
state court decisions also are conclusive; Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, supra note 92.
Claims for relief, historically of an equitable nature, are governed by state
statutes and decisions, Ruhlin v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S.202, 58 Sup. Ct.
860, 82 L. ed. 1290 (1938), but not because of § 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789; see Mason v. United States, 260 U. S.545, 558-9, 43 Sup. Ct 200 (1923)
("It was urged * * * that § 721 of the Revised Statutes, which provides that
the laws of the several States shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials
at common law in the courts of the United States, by implication excludes such
laws7 as rules of decision in equity suits. The statute, however, is merely
declarative of the rule which would exist in the absence of the statute.");
Russell v. Todd, 309 U. S. 280, 287, 60 Sup. Ct.527 (1940), reh. denied, 310
U. S.658, 60 Sup. Ct. 1091 (1940) ("The Rules of Decision Act does not apply
to suits in equity."); Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson. (1938) 47 YALEn
L. J.1336, 1345.
96 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 72-73, 77-80, 58 Sup. Ct 817
(1938).
97 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. ed. 865 (U. S.1842).
98 Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S.64, 74-77, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938);
see Sampson v. Channell, 110 F. (2d) 754, 756 (C.C. A. 1st, 1940) ; Shulman,
The Demise of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1336, 1346-7. Cf. Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. -, -- 61 Sup. Ct. 1020, 1021
(1941).
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law-failed to fulfill its purpose and has been supplanted by
a different principle-supremacy of state law-but only to
attain the same objective. An objective sought in both cases
was conformity in rules of decision."" Swift v. Tyson failed
in this respect because state courts persisted in exercising
their own independent judgment. 10 0 Now the federal courts,
leaving the fate of uniformity to other forces, 1° 1 are to seek
conformity by following the decisions of state courts, including the opinions of trial and intermediate courts. 0 2 The
circuit courts of appeal must even conform to any change of
state law occurring after entry of judgment in the district
court but before determination of an appeal. 0 3
In the application of this new principle of conformity to
cases involving the Federal Rules, the policy question to be
resolved is one of degree-how far shall the principle of conformity be carried. Some federal courts seem to have con99 The dominant policy basis for the decision in Swift v. Tyson was the
desirability of uniformity of rules of decision with respect to commercial
transactons regardless of the place where enforcement might be sought-"The
law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared in the language of
Cicero, adopted by Lord Mansfield in Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. 883, 887, to be in a
great measure, not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial
world", 16 Pet. 1, 18. The facts of the Swift case gave additional impetus to
an expression of the desire for uniformity for not only was there diversity of
citizenship but the transaction was interstate, having several contacts with
Maine as well as New York. Cf. Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson
(1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1336, 1340. Because Mr. Justice Story believed, as he
demonstrated in the Swift case, that judicial decisions were only evidence of
law and not the law, it is not unreasonable to believe he assumed the state
courts would treat the Supreme Court's decisions on commercial law as highly
persuasive with the result that there would be not only national uniformity but
also conformity of rules of decision between federal and state courts.
100 See Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 74, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
101 Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1336,
1349.
102 Six Companies v. Highway Dist., 311 U. S. 180, 61 Sup. Ct. 186 (1940);
West v. A. T. & T. Co., 311 U. S.223, 61 Sup. Ct. 179 (1940) ; Stoner v. N. Y.
Life Ins. Co., 311 U. S. 464, 61 Sup. Ct. 336 (1940) ; Fidelity Union Trust Co.
v. Field, 311 U. S. 169, 61 Sup. Ct 176 (1940), the facts of this case indicate
that the federal courts are bound by the decisions of trial courts of general
jurisdiction; for a thorough explanation of the organization of the Court of
Chancery in New Jersey, the court involved in the Fidelity Union case, see
Gregory v. Gregory, 67 N. J. Eq. 7, 58 Atl. 287 (1904), cited in the Fidelity
Union case.
103 Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U. S. 538, 61 Sup. Ct. 347
(1941). Although a state supreme court may not regard itself as bound by a
decision upon a second appeal, the circuit courts of appeal do not have the same
power to reconsider interpretatigns of state law by state courts as do the
highest courts of the state in which a decision has been rendered. See Moore v.
Illinois Cent. R. R., 312 U. S. 630, 633, 61 Sup. Ct. 754, 755 (1941).
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eluded that they must conform to state law to whatever
extent may be necessary to prevent a judge or jury, in any
particular case, finding the law or facts differently in the
federal courts than in the state courts.10 4 The Supreme
Court's cursory opinion in Gities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap,0 r

lent weight to this view, for it was there held that a district
court should follow the state law as to burden of proof on
the issue of bona fide purchaser for value without notice,
because the reliance of the holder of the recorded legal title
on this local rule (that burden of proof was upon the person
asserting a superior equity) was a "substantial right". 10 6
However, it is doubtful that the actual holding in Erie v.
Tompkins 107 and the elimination of the "political and social"

defects 108 enumerated in that case require so broad an interpretation. These necessarily lead only to the conclusion that
the evil to be extirpated was the conflict of law that often
made a person's conduct, in a particular place at any given
time, both lawful and unlawful; the final characterization
depending on the unpredictable factor of what sovereign's
aid might finally be invoked. 09 In this view of the policy of
104 Sampson v. Channell, 110 F. (2d) 754, 756 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) ("it is
unfair and unseemly to have the outcome of litigation substantially affected by
the fortuitous existence of diversity of citizenship"); cf. Beagle v. Northern
Pac. Ry., 32 F. Supp. 17 (W. D. Wash. 1940) ; Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F.
Supp. 1 (E. D. Ill. 1938); Schopp v. Muller Dairies, 25 F. Supp. 50 (E. D.
N. Y. 1938). Commentators concur: Note (1938) 38 COL. L. REv 1472;
Holtzoff, Twelve Months Under the New Rules of Civil Procedure (1940) 26
A. B. A. J. 45; Commentary (1940) 3 F. R. S. 661; Note (1941) 29 CALIF. L.
REv. 228, 230.
105 308 U. S. 208, 60 Sup. Ct. 201 (1939).
106 But see infra pp. 39-40; Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, 13-14, 61
Sup. Ct 422, 426 (1941).
107 Upon strict interpretation the case stands only for the proposition that
in diversity cases the federal courts should refer to the decisional law of the
state to determine whether plaintiff was a licensee or merely a trespasser. The
decision in Ruhlin v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202, 58 Sup. Ct. 860 (1938)
extending the doctrine of the Erie -case to suits in equity adds nothing in this
respect for it simply held that the terms of an insurance contract should be
interpreted according to state law.
10 The defects were threefold: "the impossibility of discovering a satisfactory line of demarcation between the province of general law and that of
local law developed a new well of uncertainties. * * * Swift v. Tyson introduced
grave discrimination by non-citizens against citizens. It made rights enjoyed
under the nhnwritten 'general law' vary according to whether enforcement was
sought in the state court or in the federal court; and the privilege of selecting
the court * * * was conferred upon the non-citizen." Erie R. R. v. Tompkins,
304 U. S. 64, 74-75, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
109 This seems true for the other defects listed by Mr. Justice Brandeis,

supra note 108, flow solely from the most obvious one that a state court and

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 16

the Tompkimns case, adoption of the traditional definition of
"substantive law"-"The rules that determine the legal relations when all of the facts have been made known to the
Court" 110 -- would serve as a fairly obvious line of demarcation between the area controlled by state law and that subject
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I am not imputing
any intrinsic soundness to this particular definition 111 but
suggest only that it will efficiently subserve
the policies of
112
the Erie case and of the Enabling Act.
If this definition is not applied and it is held that Rule 1
doesn't mean what it says:
These rules govern procedure * * * in all suits of a civil nature ** *
there is no reason to expect less confusion than arose in the
attempt to give certainty to the words "as near as may be"
of the Conformity Act, 1 8 or that there will not be "a new
well of uncertainties" to clog the administration of justice,
arising from the fact that the4 validity of many provisions of
the Rules will be in doubt."2
Moreover, in order to rule, in cases based on diversity of
citizenship, that certain provisions of the Federal Rules shall
be replaced by local rules of practice varying from state to
state, the Supreme Court must first consider the objection
that the Tesulting lack of uniform procedure would run
counter to the determination of Congress implicit in the
Enabling Act that uniformity of procedure throughout all
the federal court, sitting in that state, could and did arrive at opposite conclusions on the legality of a particular act or omission; discrimination against
citizens arose because with the non-citizen rested the privilege of selecting the
forum applying the more favorable of two contradictory rules of decision; the
well of uncertainties developed from the inability to predict whether the federal
courts in a given situation would follow local law or announce their own rule.
110 Note (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 308, 310.
11 Cf. Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws (1933)
42 YALE L. J.333; Clark, The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules (1941)
24 J.Am. Jun. Soc. 158, 160.
212Act of June 19, 1934, c. 651, 48 STAT. 1064, 28 U. S. C. §§ 723b, 723c.
11 Act of June 1, 1872, c. 255, § 5, 17 STAT. 197, REv. STAT. § 914, 28
U. S. C. § 724. That the Federal Rules by virtues of § 1 of the Enabling Act,
supra note 112, have repealed the Conformity Act, see Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U. S.1, 10, 61 Sup. Ct. 422, 425-(1941).
"1 See Clark, The Tompkins Case and the FederalRules (1941) 24 J. Am.
Jun. Soc. 158, 161, "if some of the rules already attacked are properly to be
questioned, there are other rules * * * left in a very precarious position. * * *
more than half the rules can be questioned if some of the views already in
print as to the wide content of 'substance' are sound."
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federal courts was desirable. The court must also consider
whether it has the power to amend, by the process of decision,
those rules which it has recently stated have "the force of a

federal statute". 1 15
In the absence of a decision by the Supreme Court clearly
indicating that the Federal Rules are independent of, or an
exception to, the doctrine of the Erie case, several of the
rules have been attacked-successfully in a number of

instances.
Rule 3 provides that a "civil action is commenced by
filing a complaint with the court." The Supreme Court has

held that state statutes of limitations were applicable to
actions at law in the federal courts "I" under the Rules of
Decision Act. 1 7 At present the policy of the Erie case would

seem to command that local statutes of limitations be classified as "substantive", irrespective of the manner in which a

particular statute may be worded-that is whether it "extinguishes the right" or merely "bars the remedy". 118 The fact

that such statutes may be characterized as "substantive" does
not eliminate all problems. For example, in New York an
action is "commenced by the service of a summons." 119 This
New York rule as to the commencement of an action raises
the question, under Erie v. Tompkins, whether filing the complaint will toll the statute of limitations. There would seem

to be no violation of the policy of the Erie case by holding
that compliance with Rule 3 stops the running of the statute
15 See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, 13, 61 Sup. Ct. 422, 426
(1941). But see dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, at p. 18,
"Plainly the Rules are not acts of Congress and cannot be treated as such.
Having due regard to the mechanics of legislation and the practical conditions
surrounding the business of Congress when the Rules were submitted, to draw
any inference of tacit approval from non-action by Congress is to appeal to
unreality."
116 Diversity cases: Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U. S. 647, 13 Sup. Ct. 466
(1893); cf. Moore v. Illinois Cent. R. ]R, 312 U. S. 630, 61 Sup. Ct. 754
(1941). Cases involving a federal question: Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S.
610, 15 Sup. Ct. 217 (1895); Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp.,
110 F. (2d) 15 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 639, 60 Sup. Ct 1087

(1940).

117 28 U. S. C. § 725.
11s Cf. Sampson v. Channell, 110 F. (2d) 754, 756 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940);

Commentary (1940) 4 F. R. S. 884; see, Generally, 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1935) 1620-1629.
119 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT (1941) § 218.
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in any state where local practice provides some method of
tolling the statute such as substituted service.12 0 In New
York, as against resident defendants, in cases where the statute is about to run and personal service on the defendant may
be difficult, attorneys may avoid the risks of litigating the
validity of this construction of Rule 3 under the Tomnpkins
case by first filing the complaint as prescribed by Rule 3 and
then by virtue of Rule 4 (d), which authorizes service in the
manner prescribed by state law, delivering the summons and
complaint to the United States Marshal for service in accordance with New York Civil Practice Act § 17. Under § 17,
there is a sixty-day period of grace within which to
serve the summons on defendant personally within or
without the State of New York, or to make substituted
service or to commence service by publication. However,
there is the possibility that the federal courts may hold
that unless they acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant, the statute will not be tolled. If the defendant
is served within the State of New York, within the sixty-day
period, by the United States Marshal for the district in which
defendant last resided, it would seem that such personal
jurisdiction has been acquired and that the statute is
tolled.'
Although the New York courts consider "substituted" service the equivalent of personal service for the purpose of determining that they have jurisdiction over the
person of a resident defendant, 22 the federal courts following
the analogy of Big Vein Coal Company v. Read,12 3 might hold
that such "substituted" service would be insufficient to toll
the statute. But this seems unlikely because Rule 4(d) (1)
expressly permits a similar type of service (that is, leaving
But see Commentary (1940) 4 F. R. S. 884.
R. C. P. 4(f) and N. Y. Civ. P.Ac. AcT § 17. But see Carby v.
Greco, 31 F. Supp. 251 (W. D. Ky. 1940) ; Melekov v. Collins, 30 F. Supp.
159 (S. D. Cal. 1939).
122 Huntley v. Baker, 33 Hun 578 (N. Y. 1884) ; see Rawstone v. Maguire,
265 N. Y. 204, 207, 192 N. E. 294 (1934). Contrary to the rule in other jurisdictions, in New York the words "substituted service" have a limited meaning
and do not include service by publication and personal service without the state,
N. Y. CIV. PRAC. AcT § 231.
123229 U. S. 31, 33 Sup. Ct. 694 (1913).
It was held in this case that in
an action commenced in a federal court, jurisdiction over defendant's property
in the district could not be acquired by attachment without personal service of
the summons upon the defendant within the district.
120

121 F.
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copy of the summons and complaint at defendant's usual
place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion) without requiring all the safeguards for insuring actual
notice that are part of "substituted" service in New York.
However, service of the summons without the state and service by publication will probably be considered insufficient.
In Gallagherv. Carrol, 124 Judge Byers of the Eastern
District of New York stated that Erie v. Tompkins was
inapplicable and that Rule 3 was controlling in view of the
fact that the applicable statute of limitations of Pennsylvania was silent on the method of commencing suit. In a
recent decision in Michigan, it was held without discussing
the applicability of the Erie doctrine, but citing both state
and federal decisions, that the local statute of limitations
was tolled when the complaint had been filed and the sum125
mons issued.
The most frequently discussed provision is Rule 8(c)
requiring generally that in answering a pleading any matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense shall be set
forth affirmatively. Certain defenses, including contributory
negligence, are specifically mentioned. Because the burden
of proof often follows the burden of pleading 1 20 and in view
of federal decisions 127 prior to Erie v. Tompkins it has been
argued that Rule 8 (c) also implicitly establishes the rule as
28
to burden of proof of the issues therein mentioned.1
The question of conflict between Rule 8 (c) and the Erie
case has been raised several times with respect to the burden
of pleading and of proof of contributory negligence. Under
Swift v. Tyson 1 29 the rule on that issue was treated as a
matter of substance and of general law and the federal courts
established their independent rule that such burden was upon
124 27 F.
125

Supp. 568 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).

Schram v. Cudnau, 4 F. R. S. 35 (E. D. Mich. 1940).

128 9

WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940)

§ 2486.

Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 35 Sup. Ct. 865 (1915).
128 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938)
571; 3 id. 3071; cf. Sampson v.
Channell, 110 F. (2d) 754, 757 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940), "Rule 8(c) speaks of
127

contributory negligence as an affirmative defense', a phrase implying that the
burden of proof is on the defendant."
129 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. ed. 865 (U. S. 1842).
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the defendant. 13 0 Since the Erie decision, several cases have
held that burden of proof as to contributory negligence was
a matter of substantive law and the local rule was to be
followed. 131 In Frazwis v. Humphrey, 3 2 Judge Wham of the
Eastern District of Illinois dismissed the complaint because
plaintiff had failed to plead freedom from contributory negligence, in accordance with the Illinois rule.
The most persuasive decision to date is the opinion of
3 3 decided in the
Judge Magruder in Sampson v. Uhannell,1
First Circuit. The claim for relief arose out of an automobile
collision in Maine. The action was brought in the federal
district court of Massachusetts. The trial judge instructed
the jury in accordance with Maine law that plaintiff had the
burden of proving freedom from contributory negligence.
The jury returned a general verdict for'defendant but found
specially that plaintiff's injury was caused by the negligence
of defendant's testator. On appeal the judgment was reversed
for error in the instructions given the jury on the burden of
proof. Judge Peters dissented and Judge Wilson concurred
only in the result, so Judge Magruder's opinion has only the
weight of its intrinsic merit.
The rationale of the case was as follows: Rule 8(c) is
only a rule of pleading; therefore, the rule as to burden of
proof must be gleaned from other sources. On re-examination
of federal decisions in the light of the new federal policy, it
is clear that the incidence of burden of proof may determine
"the outcome of the case"; therefore, for the purposes of the
Tompkins case the federal courts must classify the rule as to
burden of proof of contributory negligence as a rule of substantive law and follow state law. But the federal court must
again characterize the rule as either "substantive" or "procedural" and this time the classification must be made according to the conflict of laws decisions of the state in which the
130 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

(1938) 571.

131 Fort Dodge Hotel Co. v. Bartelt, 119 F. (2d) 253 (C.
Sampson v. Channell, 110 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) ;
Dairies, 25 F. Supp. 50 (E. D. N. Y. 1938) ; cf. Francis v.
Supp. 1 (E. D. Ill.
1938).
13225 F. Supp. 1 (E. D. Ill.
1938). Contra: Kellman v.

726 (N. D. Iowa 1941).

C. A. 8th, 1941);
Schopp v. Muller
Humphrey, 25 F.
Stoltz, 1 F. R. D.

233 110 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 650, 60

Sup. Ct. 1099 (1940).
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federal court is sitting to determine whether the local rule
or the rule of the place where the claim for relief accrued
shall be applied.134 This must be done for three reasons:
(1) it is the purpose of the Erie case to obtain conformity in

rules of decision between a particular federal court and the
state wherein it exercises jurisdiction, not between that federal court and the state in which the claim for relief arises;

(2) the state court decisions on characterization of legal
rules for choice of law purposes are part of the common law
of that state, hence within the prescription of Eric v. Tompkins; and (3) to carry out the policy of the Erie case to
prevent disparity in the outcome of actions, the federal court
must apply the same rules that the state court would have
applied. For the purpose of determining whether to apply
the rule of the forum or the rule of the place where the claim
for relief arose, the state courts of Massachusetts classify the
rule as to burden of proof on the issue of contributory negligence as "procedural" and apply their own rule that such
burden is upon the defendant. Consequently, the federal
court sitting in Massachusetts should have followed the
Massachusetts rule and instructed the jury that the burden
of proof was upon the defendant, its contrary instruction
134 Sampson v. Channell, supra note 133, at 760-762. The question whether
conflict of laws decisions of state courts were to be followed under Erie v.
Tompkins was expressly left open in Ruhlin v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S.
202, 208, n.2, 58 Sup. Ct. 860, 82 L. ed. 1290 (1938) ("Under the general doctrine the interpretation of an insurance contract depends on the law of the
place where the policy is delivered. * * * We do not now determine which
principle must be enforced if the Pennsylvania [state where case was tried;
place of delivery was unknown, the insurance company was a New York corporation] courts follow a different conflict of laws rule"). But cf. Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, 10-11, 61 Sup. Ct 422, 425 (1941) discussed in
Commentary (1941) 4 F. R. S. 921. See Commentary (1940) 2 F. R. S.
627, 628. The defects of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, cited supra note 94,
cannot be obviated unless the conflict of laws decisions of state courts are held
to be within the scope of Erie v. Tompkins. Note (1941) 29 CAmLn. L. REv.
228, 321. In Stentor Electric Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 115 F. (2d) 268 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1940) the Circuit Court of Appeals decided a conflict of laws problem
without referring to the conflict of laws decisions of the state in which the
District Court was sitting. Because of the conflict of approach to this problem
between the opinion in the Stentor case and Judge Magruder's opinion in
Sampson v. Channell, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and, following
Judge Magruder's reasoning, held that, under Erie v. Tompkins, the conflict of
laws rules to be applied by a federal court must conform to those prevailing in
the state courts of the state in which the federal court is sitting, otherwise "the
accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side."
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. -, 61 Sup. Ct. 1020 (1941).
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(following the Maine rule that such burden was upon the
plaintiff) was erroneous.
It should be noted that the Circuit Court's direction to
the District Court was wholly consistent with a holding that
Rule 8(c) also establishes the rule that burden of proof of
contributory negligence is upon the defendant and that it
1 35
was to be applied to the case.
In MacDonaldv. Centra Vermont Ry.,136 Judge Hincks
of the District of Connecticut held that a complaint failing
to allege plaintiff's freedom froh contributory negligence
was not defective, for, although the burden of pleading freedom from contributory negligence was upon the plaintiff
under Connecticut law at that time (except in wrongful
death cases), the federal courts were free to follow Rule 8(c)
because the state courts of Connecticut considered the incidence of the burden of proof on this issue to be merely a
matter of procedure and not a part of the substantive law of
that state. The situation in New York is similar. Though
the plaintiff need not plead freedom from contributory negligence, 1 37 he has the burden of proof on that issue,1 38 except
in death actions 139 and in actions for injuries caused by employer's negligence.140 As in Connecticut, the courts of New
York consider the rule a matter of procedure for the purpose
of determining that a statute changing the rule will have
retroactive effect and also in holding that they will apply the
4
local rule to causes of action accruing outside the state.' 1
135 It has been suggested that the court could have reached this conclusion
directly on the theory that the courts of Massachusetts have not indicated that
any question of vital policy of the state was involved in its rule, placing on the
defendant the burden of proving plaintiff's contributory negligence. Clark,
Procedural Aspects of the New State Independence (1940) 8 Gao. WASH. L.
REv. 1230, 1235-8; Clark, The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules (1941)
24 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 158, 159.
136 31 F. Supp. 298 (D. Conn. 1940).
137 Lee v. Troy Citizens' Gas-Light Co., 98 N. Y. 115 (1885).
138 Whalen v. Citizens' Gas Light Co., 151 N. Y. 70 (1896);
Weston v.
City of Troy, 139 N. Y. 281 (1893) ; Reynolds v. N. Y. Cent & H. River R. R.,
58 N. Y. 248 (1874); see Sackheim v. Pigueron, 215 N. Y. 62, 75, 109 N. E.

109, 113 (1915); Baxter y. Auburn & Syracuse El. R. R., 190 N. Y. 439, 441,
83 N. E. 469 (1908); Lee v. Troy Citizens' Gas-Light Co., 98 N. Y. 115, 119

(1885).3 9
2

N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr (1941)

1
40 N. Y. EMPLOYERS'

§ 265; N. Y. DEc. EsT.

LIABILITY LAW § 5

LAW

§ 131.

(formerly N. Y. LABOR LAW
§202-a) ; Hall v. N. Y. Telephone Co., 220 N. Y. 229, 115 N. E. 704 (1917).
141 Sackheim v. Pigueron, 215 N. Y. 62, 109 N. E. 109 (1915) ; Wright v.
Palmison, 237 App. Div. 22, 260 N. Y. Supp. 812 (2d Dep't 1932) ; compare
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This theory of the MacDonald case, approved by Judge
Charles E. Clark, 142 does not effectively dispose of the reasoning in the Sampson case because it is based on a different
understanding of the purpose of the Tanpkis case than that
assumed by Judge Magruder. The basic purpose of the Erie
case is not to protect states' rights-to uphold rules of law
considered expressions of vital state policy by the courts and
legislatures of the states. 14 3 Rather it was the purpose of the
Erie case to aid the persons inhabiting the states in conducting and planning their activities by reducing the area of
unpredictability of the law governing their daily conduct.
Conformity to state law is a method to do that, not a means
of enhancing the sovereign irresponsibility of the several
states. The reasoning of Sampson v. ChannelZ and its choice
of law to resolve each question seems correct. The only
question about the Sampson case is this: Did it misinterpret
the underlying policy of the Tomnpkin case by requiring too
great a degree of conformity to state law.
In Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dwnlap,14 which did not
involve the Federal Rules nor interpret any provision of the
Equity Rules, the Supreme Court held that the district court
should have applied the local rule as to burden of proof on
the issue of bona fide purchaser for value without notice-by
Texas law this burden is on the person asserting an equity
superior to the record title to land. Mr. Justice McReynolds,
speaking for the Court, said that the questions related to a
"substantial right upon which the holder of recorded legal
title to Texas land may confidently rely". This decision is, of
course, not conclusive as to the operation of Rule 8 (c). MoreFitzpatrick v. International Ry., 252 N. Y. 127, 134-135, 169 N. E. 112, 115

(1929).

Supra note 135.
That portion of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Field in Baltimore
& Ohio R. R. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 401 (1893), quoted in Erie v. Tompkins,
304 U. S. 64, 78-79, 58 Sup. Ct 817, lends itself to the opposite interpretation:
"* * * 'there stands, as a perpetual protest against its repetition, the Constitution of the United States, which recognizes and preserves the autonomy and
independence of the States-independence in their legislative and independence
in their judicial departments. Supervision over either the legislative or the
judicial action of the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the
Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States. Any
interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority
142

243

of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.'
144 308 U. S. 208, 60 Sup. Ct. 201 (1939).
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over, it is not certain that the Supreme Court would today
rule that a "substantial right" is sufficient to invoke the
Tompkins case. In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,145 in deciding

that Rule 35, authorizing physical examination of parties,
was a valid exercise of the rule-making power, the majority
of the Supreme Court indicated that the test of a "substan-

tive right" within the meaning of the Enabling Act 146 was
identical with the test of substantive law under Erie v.
Tompkins, and rejected plaintiff's contention that the word
"substantive" in the Enabling Act meant merely "important"
or "substantial". The majority then adopted, for the purpose
of construing this Act, the traditional distinction between
147
"substance" and "procedure".

In some states, of which New York is one,1 48 it is not

essential that the plaintiff in a stockholder's action allege in
his complaint, as he must under Federal Rule 23 (b), that he

"was a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he
complains or that his share thereafter devolved on him by

operation of law". 14 9 This provision was taken from Equity
Rule 27, formerly Equity Rule 94, 150 adopted shortly after

the decision of Hawes v. Oakland151 and is simply a codification of the requirements set up in that decision. Prior to the

Erie case and the adoption of the Federal Rules, Equity Rule
145 312 U. S. 1, 61 Sup.
246 28 U. S. C. § 723b.

Ct. 422 (1941).

147 "Is the phrase 'substantive rights' confined to rights conferred by law to
be protected and enforced in accordance with the adjective law of judicial
procedure? It certainly embraces such rights. One of them is the right not
to be injured in one's person by another's negligence, to redress infraction of
which the present action was brought. The petitioner says the phrase connotes
more; that by its use Congress intended that in regulating procedure this court
should not deal with important and substantial rights theretofore recognized.
* * * If we were to adopt the suggested criterion of the importance of the
alleged right we should invite endless litigation and confusion worse confounded.
The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,-the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them."
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, 13-14, 61 Sup. Ct. 422, 426 (1941).
148 Pollitz v. Gould, 202 N. Y. 11, 94 N. E. 1088 (1911) ; for the rule in
other states, see Note (1938) 38 COL. L. Rav. 1472, 1480, n.53.
149 F. R. C. P. 23(b) also requires plaintiff to allege that he demanded
appropriate action by the directors or stockholders, the reasons for failure to
obtain such action or the reasons for not making such effort.
150 104 U. S. ix (Jan. 23, 1882).

15,104 U. S. 450 (1882).
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27 had been viewed in some federal cases as a substantive
principle of equity and in others as only a procedural device
to prevent collusive suits in the federal courts. 1 2 Even the
opinion in Ha4ves v. Oakland is equivocal, although the purpose of the rule-to prevent collusion in conferring jurisdiction-is clearly expressed.
This requirement of Rule 23(b) was one of the first
provisions to be considered of doubtful validity under Erie
v. Tompkins,'5 3 but the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit recently held in Cohen v. YoUng 154 that Rule
23 (b) should be applied until the Supreme Court takes some
action because it has been recognized as a rule of procedure
by the Supreme Court and Congress in the promulgation and
adoption of the Rules, saying:
Equity Rule 27 was, however, a rule of procedure, so recognized by
the Supreme Court and by the Congress in the promulgation and
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which re-enacted it
as Rule 23. We are not at liberty, therefore, to depart from it.
Whether the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompldns will lead ultimately
to a modification of the rule or to recognition of the right as one of
substantive law, to be controlled by state statutes and decisions, is
beyond our ability to forecast, not being endowed with the gift of
prophecy. We still conceive it to be our function to apply the law as
we find it.
It has also been suggested that Rule 23 (b) can be upheld on
the ground that it is a jurisdictional requirement. 5 '
To determine the effect to be given Rule 23(b) three
types of cases must be considered:
(1) Actions commenced in or removed to a, federal court
because of the existence of a, federal question
Where a secondary action is brought to assert a federal
right, state law has no application for the Supreme Court
152 Note (1938)
153 CLEVELAND

38 COL. L. REv. 1472, 1482.
INsTiTUTE oN FEDERAL RULES (1938) 184, 265 (statements

by William D. Mitchell and Charles E. Clark); NEw YORK SYmPOsiUm ON

(1938) 227-228 (statement by William D. Mitchell); Summers
v. Hearst, 23 F. Supp. 986 (S. D. N. Y. 1938); Note (1938) 38 Col. L. REV.
1472, 1483-4.
FEDERAL RULES

1544 F. R. S. 412 (1941).

155 Note (1941)

41 CoL L. REV. 104, 116-17.
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necessarily excepted from the doctrine of the Erie case such
matters as are governed by the Constitution or acts of Congress. 15 6 Even if Rule 23 (b) be considered substantive, there
is no problem under the Enabling Act for the rule makes no
1 57
change in the previous federal law.
(2) Actions commenced in a federal court because of
diversity of citizenship
Different purposes have been ascribed to Equity Rule 27
and its predecessor Rule 94 by the Supreme Court; some of
these purposes clearly indicated that the rule had a substantive content. Of course, these views were expressed under an
entirely different situation than that with which the courts
are faced since the decision of Erie v. Tompkins. Consequently, the method of Judge Magruder in Sampson v.
Channell 158 is appropriate-the decisions by the Supreme
Court construing Equity Rule 27 should be re-examined in
view of the new federal policy. There is no question but that
one purpose of Equity Rule 27 was to prevent collusive trans1 59
Colfers of stock to obtain federal diversity jurisdiction.
lusive transfer of stock to confer jurisdiction is possible in
actions either commenced in or removed to a federal court
because of diversity of citizenship. Such collusion is easy of
accomplishment for actions commenced in the federal courts
and apparently was of frequent occurrence. Though not
impossible, such collusion is improbable in actions removed
to the federal court by the defendant because of diversity of
citizenship. In actions commenced in federal courts because
of diversity of citizenship-the cases where collusion to confer jurisdiction is more probable--Rule 23(b) can be sustained as a "procedural" device to exclude many of them
through the requirement of prior ownership. An additional
reason for sustaining the rule is the fact that it aids the

156 See Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78, 58 Sup. Ct 817 (1938).
157 Equity Rule 27; Advisory Committee Note to Rule 23.
158 110 F. (2d) 754, 756 (1940).
159 Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450 (1882) ; Note (1938) 38 CoL L. REv.

1472, 1481-2.
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federal courts in avoiding interference with the internal
affairs of corporations not organized under federal law.16
(3) Actions removed from state to federal court because of
diversity of citizenship
In removed cases the probability of collusion to confer
jurisdiction is too remote to justify Rule 23(b) as "procedural" but the other purpose-to avoid interference with the
internal affairs of corporations not organized under federal
law might be sufficient to justify the rule. However, to
apply Rule 23(b) as a procedural rule to removed cases
would operate to deprive plaintiffs of rights that are unquestionably substantive, for by removal the defendant could
prevent plaintiff from enforcing rights granted by state law
in those instances where plaintiff cannot comply with Rule
23 (b), because the federal courts in such cases will dismiss
actions instead of remanding.' 6 '
There is another possible solution of the problem of the
effect to be given Rule 23 (b) under the Tompkins case. The
courts might sustain Rule 23 (b) as a jurisdictional requirement applicable to all diversity cases-jurisdictional, not in
the strict sense of statutory and constitutional power, but
rather in a broader sense connoting any situation which
would induce the federal courts to remand a removed case.
This analysis would probably require an overruling of Venner
v. Great Northern Ry.1
y 62 and a reassertion of the principle of
63
Cates v. A~len, that even though the statutory requirements
of jurisdiction are satisfied, a federal court which is unable to
64
give relief may remand the case for lack of jurisdiction.1
160

Cf. Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U. S. 123, 53 Sup. Ct. 295

(1933).
161 Venner v. Great Northern Ry., 209 U. S. 24, 28 Sup. Ct. 328 (1908).
Even though a particular plaintiff might not be able to enforce the substantive
rights of the class of stockholders, the rule of Erie v. Tompkins may not be
applicable unless no member of the class is in a position to comply with Rule
23(b). See Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 36 F. Supp, 1006, 1010 (S. D. N. Y. 1941)
("Undoubtedly a right without a remedy has no substance, and if the invocation
of Rule 23(b) would result in a complete bar to all persons in the class, the
Erie case might be applicable." The court in this case denied motions to
intervene for failure to comply with Rule 23 (b) but without prejudice to future

applications by any stockholder who could comply with the rule).
162 Ibid.
163
164

149 U. S. 451, 13 Sup. Ct. 883 (1893).
See, generally, Note (1941) 41 COL. L. Rav. 104.
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Of all the available solutions, sustaining Rule 23 (b) as jurisdictional in the broad sense seems the most desirable for it
leaves the Rules intact, maintains the federal policy of discouraging maintenance of secondary actions in the federal
courts and prevents defendant from depriving plaintiff of his
substantive rights by removal, for if Rule 23 (b) is treated as
a jurisdictional requirement the federal courts would remand
the cases instead of dismissing them, Cates v. Allen. 165
Rule 38(a), following the limitation in § 2 of the Enabling Act, l c6 states that the right to trial by jury as declared
by the Seventh Amendment shall be preserved inviolate.
Nevertheless, there have been district court decisions to the
effect that, under Erie v. Tompkins, the right to trial by jury
in personal injury actions of the issue of fraudulent release
shall be determined by state law.16 7 It would seem that reference to state law to determine the right to trial by jury is
clearly improper, not only on the theory that this is a federal
constitutional question to be decided on the authority of
federal cases, 1 68 but also on the accepted conflict of laws
doctrine that for choice of law purposes the right of trial by
jury is a procedural matter 6 9
IV
SuiMM

Y JUDGMENT

The State of New York was one of the first jurisdictions
in this country to adopt the device of summary judgment; its
constitutionality was upheld in General Investment Co. v.
165 Cates v. Allen, stpra note 163.

§

18628 U. S. C.
723c.
167 Ross v. Service Lines,

31 F. Supp. 871 (E. D. Ill. 1940); Beagle v.
Northern Pac. Ry., 32 F. Supp. 17 (W. D. Wash. 1940). Contra: Hollingsworth6 8v. General Petroleum Corp., 26 F. Supp. 917 (D. Ore. 1939).
1 Hollingsworth v. General Petroleum Corp., 26 F. Supp. 917 (D. Ore.
1939) ; see Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 7 L. ed. 732 (U. S. 1830) ; Erie v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78, 58 Sup. Ct 817 (1938) ; Note (1940) 88 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 1015. But see dissenting opinion of McLean, J. in Parsons v. Bedford,
3 Pet. 433, 448 (U. S. 1830).
169 Note (1940) 88 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1015, 1016; RESTATEMENT OF CONFiacr OF LAws §§ 584, 585, 594; 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws (1935) 1607-09.
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Interborough R1apid Transit Co.J 70° and, under the Conformity Act, was employed in the federal courts in New
York in actions at law.17 1 This useful procedure has since
been made a part of the new federal practice where it has a
much broader field of operation than in New York.
Federal Rule 56 permits any party to move for summary judgment, whether he is seeking to recover upon or to
oppose a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim for relief, including declaratory relief. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if (1) the pleadings, (2) the depositions
and (3) the admissions on file, together with (4) any affidavits show that, except as to the amount of damages, there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
This rule is applicable in all actions, including those
against the United States or an officer or agency thereof, 7 2
and-to the extent that it is available in any action-it is a
departure from the existing New York rules. 7 3 The motion
may be made with or without supporting affidavits. Supporting or opposing affidavits used on the motion must, as
specifically prescribed in Rule 56, fulfil the following requirements:
(1) They must4 be on personal knowledge or they will
17
considered.
be
not
(2) The facts stated therein must be admissible in evidence. A motion under Rule 12(f) to strike has been held
a proper method of attacking an affidavit containing inadmissible statements of fact.1 75
(3) The affidavits must show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters therein stated; the
170 235 N. Y. 133, 139 N. E. 216 (1923).

171 Maslin v. Columbia Nat. Life Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 368 (S. D. N. Y.
1932), and cases cited therein.
172 Notes of Advisory Committee to Rule 56; Boerner v. United States, 26
F. Supp. 769 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
173Rules 113, 114, N. Y. Ru.s CiviL PRACTIC.
For thorough discussion
of these Rules cf. Shientag, Summary Tudgment (1935) 4 FORDHAu L. REV.
186.
'17 Person v. United States, 112 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940), cert.
denied, 311 U. S. 672, 61 Sup. Ct. 31 (1940); Hummel v. Wells Petr. Co., 111 F.
(2d) 883 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); Boerner v. United States, 26 F. Supp. 769
(E. D. N. Y. 1939).
75 Fox v. Johnson & Wimsatt, 31 F. Supp. 64 (D. C. 1940).
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affidavits of persons coming within Section 347 of the New
York Civil Practice Act treating of personal transactions or
communications between witness and decedents or lunatics,
and similar sections of the Civil Practice Act, therefore, cannot be used over proper objections. But an affidavit is not
rendered inadmissible solely because the affiant may not be
1 76
compelled to testify.
The courts should be exacting as to the quantum of proof
required to support a motion for summary judgment. For
example, a primafacie showing sufficient to sustain the granting of a temporary injunction will not justify the granting
of summary judgment in an action for copyright infringement.1 77 This seems a proper holding considering that summary judgment is a final disposition of apparent issues raised
by the pleadings.
In a case which came before the Second Circuit1 7 8 the
defendant had moved for summary judgment. The plaintiff
interposed affidavits which went beyond the limits of its
complaint. On the theory that a party is limited to the confines of his pleading, the District Judge stated that these
affidavits could not be considered on the motion. The Circuit
Judges refused to commit themselves, however, to the proposition that on a motion for summary judgment affidavits
going beyond the complaint can under no circumstances be
considered, saying:
The judgment finally disposes of the action, and if facts appear in
affidavits which would justify an amended complaint, there may be
ground for treating the complaint as though it were already amended
to conform.

This liberality of allowing a party to submit proof not
provable under his pleading should not, however, be permitted if the affidavits of the moving party in contradistinction
to the opposing party go beyond the limits of his pleading,
despite the provisions of Rule 54 (c) that every final judg76

1

Banco de Espafia v. Fed. Reserve Bk. of N. Y., 114 F.

(2d)

438

(C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
177

Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 113 F. (2d) 627 (C. C.

A. 2d, 1940).
178 Seaboard Terminals Corp. v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, et at.,
104 F. (2d) 659 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939); cf. Downey v. Palmer, 114 F. (2d) 116
(C. C. A. 2d, 1940); Wyant v. Crittenden, 113 F. (2d) 170 (App. D. C. 1940).
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ment shall grant the full relief to which the party is entitled,
17 9
even though not demanded.
Contrary to the New York rule that a motion for summary judgment can only be made after joinder of issue, a
defending party under Rule 56 (b) may move before answering. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, whether an

original claim or counterclaim, etc., can only move after
service of a responsive pleading.18 0 That such a party can
only move after service of a responsive pleading has been
deemed to be a defect in the Rules which should be
remedied. 1 8 '
In Hooven, Owens, Rentschler Co. v. Royal Indemnity
Co.,.

8

2

the court held, without desiring to establish a prece-

dent, that a defendant should answer before his motion for

summary judgment would be considered, since it appeared
that defendant was in default in answering at the time summary judgment was made and in view of plaintiff's contention that defenses of laches and illegality which were the
sole grounds of defendant's motion for summary judgment
could only be invoked by answer; but in Miller v. Hoffman

V. Matthews 183 the court held that a party against whom
a counterclaim was asserted might move for summary judgment on the ground that a release had been given although
no answer to the counterclaim had been filed. This seems
to be the preferable holding.

The courts have hesitated to grant summary judgment
179 See Business Advisory Bureau, Inc. v. Stallforth, 262 App. Div. 162, 28
N. Y. S. (2d) 437 (1st Dep't 1941); Maxrice Realty Co. v. B/G Sandwich
Shops, Inc., 239 App. Div. 472, 267 N. Y. Supp. 863 (1st Dep't 1933) ; Burgin
v. Ryan, 238 App. Div. 122, 263 N. Y. Supp. 247 (2d Dep't 1933); Hallgarten
v. Wolkenstein, 204 App. Div. 487, 198 N. Y. Supp. 485 (lst Dep't 1923); but
consider concurring opinion of Judge Clark in Downey v. Palmer, 114 F. (2d)
116 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
180 F. R. C. P. 56(a); Viking Press, Inc. v. Goldman, 38 F. Supp. 1014
(S. D. N. Y. 1941).
18i Dissenting opinion United States v. Adler's Creamery, Inc., 107 F. (2d)
987 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939); cf. Charles E. Clark, A Poposed Ride of Court,
JudicialAdministrative Monographs, Series A, No. 5 (A. B. A. 1941), reprinted
in (1941) 25 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 20, permitting either party to move for summary
judgment at any time after adverse parties have appeared and adding provision
to make sure that the old rule against speaking demurrers is done away with,
providing that any form of attack upon the legal sufficiency of a claim or
defense may be supported by affidavits or other material extrinsic to the
pleadings.
182 1 F. R. D. 526 (S. D. Ohio 1940).
183 1 F. R. D. 290 (D. N. J. 1940).
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apparently because the factual situation

is usually so complicated that the distinction between formal
absence of all the
and genuine issues is not obvious in the
8 5
proof that would be offered at a trial.1
As previously stated, a motion for summary judgment
may be granted on "the pleadings, depositions and admis-

sions on file" together with affidavits complying with the requirements set forth in paragraph (e) of Rule 56. Thus,
admissions in depositions under Rule 26 as well as those
made at opponent's request under Rule 36 may be con-

sidered.

88

Answers to interrogatories under Rule 33 should like-

wise be included as admissions despite the contrary holding
s
in Town of River Jinetion v. Maryland Casualty Co. 17
The Preliminary Draft of the Rules (1936, Rule 42)

permitted the consideration of oral testimony on a motion
for summary judgment. Reference to oral testimony is omitted in Rule 56 although Rule 43 (e) provides that
When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court
may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties,
but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on
oral testimony or depositions.

Despite the general provisions in Rule 43, Rule 56 should
control since it seems improper and beyond the function of
summary judgment to permit the taking of oral testimony.
When testimony is taken there is more likely to exist in the
mind of the court an unconscious tendency to weigh the evi-

dence rather than a desire to determine whether any material
issue of fact exists.' 88 The taking of oral testimony on such
8

Weil v. N. J. Richman Co., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 401 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
It is interesting to note that in a patent suit, Milburn Mills, Inc. v.
Meister, 4 F. R. S. 741 (S. D. N. Y. 1940), summary judgment was granted on
"ocular examination" of the objects concerning which infringement was asserted,
the court making findings of fact and conclusions of law.
28 Walsh v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 566 (E. D. N. Y.
1939). Also, summary judgment may be granted against a party who fails to
respond to a request under Rule 36 for admission of facts which prove his
adversary's case: S. E. C. v. Larson, 4 F. R. S. 565 (E. D. Mich. 1941);
Merriman v. Broderick, 38 F. Supp. 13 (D. R. I. 1941); Lowden v. McAndrews, 4 F. R. S. 567 (D. Minn. 1941).
187 110 F. (2d) 278 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940).
188 Ilsen, The Preliminary Draft of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(1937) 11 ST. JoHN's L. Rxv. 212, 236-7.
1 4
185
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a motion has been called "irregular" in one case, 189 but apparently was permitted and considered without comment in
two other cases. 190
Paragraph (d) of Rule 56 further provides that if summary judgment cannot be recovered upon the whole case or
for all the relief asked, the court on the proof before it and
by interrogating counsel shall, if practicable, ascertain what
material facts exist without substantial controversy and
what material facts are actually and in good faith controversial. Thereupon, an order shall be made specifying the
facts that appear without substantial controversy-including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief
is not in controversy-which shall be deemed established
upon the trial of the action, and directing further proceedings in the action as may be just. Thus, where a judgment
in a copyright case was reversed on the ground that there
was an issue of fact as to the execution of an assignment of
copyright, the appellate court directed that the new trial
be limited to that one issue.' 91 Also, in an action by the
United States Government against numerous defendants to
enforce compliance with an order of the Secretary of Agriculture regulating the handling of milk in a certain area,
the court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff but
reserved for subsequent determination questions as to the
status of certain of the defendants and the amount due from
92
each of them.
It has also been held that summary judgment should be
18 9 Town of River Junction v. Md. Cas. Co., 110 F. (2d) 278 (C. C. A.

5th, 1940).

190 Fleming v. Phipps, 35 F. Supp. 627 (D. Md. 1940) ; Gasifier Mfg. Co.
v. Ford
Motor Co., 1 F. R. D. 10 (E. D. Mo. 1939).
19 1 Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 113 F. (2d) 627 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1940).
'192 United States v. David Buttrick Co., 28 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1939);
see also Delaney v. Markham & Callow, Inc., 2 F. R. S. 538 (D. Ore. 1939),
and Associates Disc. Corp. v. Crow, 110 F. (2d) 126 (App. D. C. 1940),
holding that where both parties moved for summary judgment it was the
trial court's duty to specify in a finding the facts that appear to be without
substantial controversy and to go forward with the trial in respect to those
facts which remain in dispute and that at the close of trial upon the
disputed facts to make findings with respect to them and to make conclusions of
law upon the whole case; the holding in Sparks v. England, 1 F. R. D. 688
(W. D. Mo. 1941) that summary judgment should not be granted on a minor
part of the issue, seems to overlook completely the pre-trial nature of Rule

56(d).
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denied if the opposing party has no actual knowledge of the
facts in respect to the allegations in the moving papers. 193
The problem presents itself whether summary judgment
should be granted on plaintiff's claim if defendant has interposed a counterclaim. To answer this question it seems
necessary to distinguish between compulsory and permissive
counterclaims.
Rule 13 defines (1) a compulsory counterclaim as any
claim not the subject of a pending action, which the pleader
has against the opposing party at the time of filing of the
responsive pleading which arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim, which must be pleaded unless its adjudication requires
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and (2) a permissive counterclaim as any
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. A simple example of a compulsory counterclaim would be a case where A sues B for the price of
goods sold and delivered and B counterclaims for breach of
warranty. An example of a permissive counterclaim is one
where A sues B for breach of contract X, and B counterclaims for breach of contract Y.
If A moves for summary judgment in a case involving
a compulsory counterclaim, what should be the court's holding if there is no question of fact as to the sale and delivery
and the contract price of the goods but the question of breach
of warranty presents a genuine issue of fact? It would seem
that under such circumstances a motion for summary
judgment under Rule 56 should be entertained but a judgment should not be entered in favor of the plaintiff. All that
the court should do in that situation is to follow the prescriptions laid down in paragraph (d) of Rule 56, which
covers the situation where a case cannot be fully adjudicated
on motion (although no specific reference is made to counterclaims, compulsory or permissive).
The court should,
therefore, ascertain the facts which exist without substan193 United States v. Gotham Pharmacal Corp., 1 F. R. D. 744 (S. D. N. Y.
1941), Rule 56(f) ; cf. Friedman v. Friedman, 251 App. Div. 835 (2d Dep't
1937); Asbury Park & Ocean Grove Bank v. Simensky, 160 Misc. 921 (Spec. T.
Kings Co. 1936).
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tial controversy; that is, the sale and delivery of the goods
and the price thereof, and what material facts are actually
and in good faith controverted, that is, the matters involving the alleged breach of warranty. An order would then
be entered specifying the facts which are without substantial controversy-which facts would be deemed established
on the trial-and directing the trial solely on the facts specified as in controversy. This method of procedure is further
justified by Rule 54(b), which provides that the court at
any stage of an action where more than one claim for relief
is presented may enter judgment only upon a determination
of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which
is the subject matter of the claim. In the order granting
this relief, the court might well direct a prompt trial of the
issues in controversy. Following the procedure just outlined
would also avoid the situation which now seems to exist in
the New York state courts which would deny the plaintiff's
motion in toto, at least where the apparently valid counterclaim demands damages in excess of that sought by the plaintiff. 194
The only reported case under Rule 56 which seems to
have been decided to date involving what appears to have
been two compulsory counterclaims is Seagrarn-Distillers
Corp. v. Manos,1' 5 where the court found that the plaintiff
was entitled to summary judgment but that defendant's counterclaims required a trial. The amount of damages demanded
in the counterclaims apparently exceeded the plaintiff's
claim.
The court found that defendant had not acted in good
faith in obtaining several continuances of the trial and ac194 See Plaut v. Plaut, 255 App. Div. 375, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 583 (lst Dep't
1938); Bank of U. S. v. Slifka, 148 Misc. 60, 264 N. Y. Supp. 204 (1933);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Nat. Dry Dock and Repair Co., 230 App. Div. 486,
245 N Y. Supp. 365 (lst Dep't 1930); Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n, Inc.
v. Egli, 228 App. Div. 164, 239 N. Y. Supp. 152 (4th Dep't 1930); see also
United States v. Stephanidis, 41 F. (2d) 958 (E. D. N. Y. 1930). These cases

were decided before the amendment to the N. Y. Civil Practice Act which

removes generally the arbitrary limitations to the interposition of counterclaims.
Now any cause of action may be interposed (C. P. A. § 266) subject only to
the restrictions set forth in C. P. A. § 267.
195 25 F. Supp. 233 (W. D. S. C. 1938) ; cf. Note (1937) 37 COL. L. Rv.

462, 474.
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cordingly granted plaintiff a summary judgment. No stay
of execution was imposed, the court only requiring the plaintiff to post a $1,000 bond to protect defendant against possible loss. The decision does not seem correct, in view of the
provisions of Rule 56 (d) and Rule 54(b) and can be justified,
only because of the peculiar circumstances of the case.
If, however, A moves for summary judgment in a case
where a permissive counterclaim is interposed-there should
be no question but that A should be entitled to judgment
for the full amount of his claim if no genuine issue as to any
material fact is raised as to his claim, even though substantial issues of fact exist as to B's counterclaim. Whether A
should* be permitted to proceed to collect his judgment or
whether a stay should be granted, pending the determination of the counterclaim, should be left to the sound discretion of the court dependent upon the circumstances of each
case. Matters such as the amounts claimed by the plaintiff
and defendant, respectively, the financial responsibility of
the parties and the probability of defendant's recovering on
his counterclaim should be taken into consideration by the
court. In this connection I suggest consideration of the
holding of the New York Court of Appeals in Irving Trust
Co. v. Leff,1 96 where summary judgment was granted in favor
of the plaintiff to the extent that his claim exceeded the defendant's counterclaim and the counterclaim and the claim
for the balance due plaintiff were reserved for trial.
Of course, an order denying summary judgment being
interlocutory is not appealable in civil actions. 19 Decisions
apparently to the contrary are distinguishable either because
they were made in bankruptcy proceedings where interlocutory orders are appealable ' 9 8 or because they are made by
the District Court for the District of Columbia which has a
special statute authorizing appeals upon certain conditions
from interlocutory orders in civil actions. 199
WERNER ILSEN.
198 253 N. Y. 359, 171 N. E. 569 (1930); for further proceedings in this
action see 137 Misc. 834, 837, 243 N. Y. Supp. 728 (1930).
197 28 U. S. C. §§ 225, 227, 227-a.
198 11 U. S. C. § 47; Cohen v. Eleven West 42d Street, Inc., 115 F. (2d)
531 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
199 Farley v. Abbetmeier, 114 F. (2d) 569 (App. D. C. 1940).

